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Abstract
This dissertation examines the changes to the European Union (EU) law on market abuse,
market manipulation, and insider trading regulation made when the Market Abuse Regulation
(MAR) was enacted. I detail the changes in comparison to the previous legislation under the Market
Abuse Directive (MAD) and changes several Member States made to their domestic legislation to
achieve compliance with MAR. I highlight the sanctions imposed in several Member States to argue
the severity of punishment under MAR. This analysis provides evidence that MAR brought about
a plausibly exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading. Next, I examine the effects of firm- and
country-level culture on insider trading profitability around the announcement, implementation,
and first enforcement of MAR. Insiders from high ESG firms tend to engage in less profitable insider
trading after the first enforcement of MAR. Insiders from high ESG firms also tend to engage in more
(less) profitable purchasing (selling) activity in the post-announcement and post-effective periods.
But these effects vary by firm size. I also study the "E" and "S" portions of ESG and find these
culture measures lead to differences in profitability in the post-MAR period. High individualism
contributes to less profitable trading after the first enforcement of MAR. High uncertainty avoidance
and high corruption contribute to more (less) profitable selling (purchasing) activity after the first
enforcement of MAR. Market reactions are significantly negative for the publication of sanctions
imposed under MAR. This negative reaction is stronger when the enforcement (1) involves illegal
insider trading, (2) is against a legal person, (3) imposes a larger pecuniary amount, and (4) was
conducted prior to COVID-19 pandemic. This effect differs by firm- and country-level culture. High
ESG and high environmental consciousness contribute to higher firm value after the first European
Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) publication of MAR enforcements. Country-level culture
and insider trading profitability do not contribute to firm value after the first ESMA report on
MAR enforcements is published.
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Chapter 1
The Market Abuse Regulation
1
Abstract
This chapter examines the changes to the European Union (EU) law on market abuse, market
manipulation, and insider trading regulation made when the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) was
enacted. First, I detail the changes in comparison to the previous legislation under the Market
Abuse Directive (MAD). Next, I detail the changes several Member States of the EU made to their
domestic regulations to achieve compliance with MAR. Third, I highlight the sanctions imposed
in several Member States to argue the severity of punishment under MAR. This analysis provides
evidence that MAR brought about a plausibly exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading.
Univariate tests reveal significant differences in insider trading profitability and market reactions
after the announcement, implementation, and first enforcement of MAR.
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Introduction
In 2005, the European Commission implemented the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) to try
to harmonize the different markets in the European Union (EU) in monitoring and punishing
market abuse, market manipulation, and insider trading.1 However, this directive became outdated
and, in some cases, obsolete as markets continued to become more complex. Therefore, in 2011,
the European Commission issued a report on the updates highly recommended to achieve better
monitoring and enforcement in the EU.2 In this report, the European Commission list several
shortcomings of the then current directive. First, MAD did not account for securities trading on
multilateral trading facilities or those trading over the counter. Second, MAD did not account for
commodity and related derivative markets. Third, under MAD, not all Member States had the
power needed to require reports be sent to their competent authorities to monitor trading activity
for possible infringements, and others did not have a full set of sanctioning powers.3 Fourth,
MAD lacked clarity and legal certainty, leaving room for Member States to interpret the directive
and implement domestic laws based on these interpretations. Last, the administrative burden on
issuers to report price sensitive information, insider lists, and disclose managers’ transactions is
exceptionally great, highlighting the need for a uniform reporting process monitored by a central
authority.
From this information, regulators in the EU worked to create the Market Abuse Regulation
(MAR). It was announced on April 16, 2014 and implemented for all Member States of the EU
on July 3, 2016. This represented a change in regime since a regulation is legally binding for all
Member States, whereas a directive requires Member States to achieve certain results using their
own interpretations of the directive’s objectives. MAR brought significant changes to the trading
landscape in the EU. I first compare the differences between MAD and MAR. I then detail the
changes several Member States made to their existing domestic regulations to achieve compliance
with MAR. I also highlight the severity of punishments under MAR from several Member States.
1Insider trading is often referred to as insider dealing in the EU.
2Report titled "Commission Staff Working Paper Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, SEC/2011/1218
final"
3The competent authority is the securities regulator for the Member State. For example, the competent authority
for France is the Autorité des Marché Financiers (AMF).
3
I use this analysis as evidence that MAR created a plausibly exogenous shock to the cost of insider
trading in the EU.
In my univariate analysis, I largely find insider trading profitability decreases after the an-
nouncement, implementation, and first enforcement of MAR. To illustrate, 1-month value-weighted
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) significantly decrease by 0.0067, 0.0110, and 0.0091 for the
announcement, effective, and enforcement periods, respectively, compared to the pre-announcement
period returns. This represents 58%, 96%, and 79% of the sample mean. I find similar results for
3-month and 6-month BHARs. I also test whether this difference is driven by buy or sell transac-
tions, splitting the sample into two subsets. I find that most results seem to driven by significantly
less profitable buying activity rather than selling activity. I also test whether the cumulative ab-
normal returns (CARs) are significantly different from zero for (0,1), (0,2) and (0,3) days around
the announcement, implementation, and first enforcement of MAR. I find evidence that the market
reacts negatively to these events.
My main contribution is a strong understanding of EU regulation, specifically MAR, and a basic
understanding of its impacts on insider trading profitability and market reactions. Many studies are
interested in the effects of regulation on market outcomes. Fauver et al. (2017) study board reforms
from 41 countries and find these reforms increase firm value. Chen et al. (2020) study international
board reforms and find firms reduce cash holdings following these reforms. Liu and Tian (2012)
find firms with excess control rights have more leverage and their controlling shareholders choose
to tunnel rather invest in positive NPV projects after the Chinese non-tradable shares reform.
Gȩbka et al. (2017) find the market abuse directive (MAD) had little effect on insider trading
profitability. Siems (2008) discusses the strengths and weaknesses of MAD. Among the weaknesses
are (1) the inability to impose sanctions for inside trades conducted on unregulated markets, (2)
the complicated process involved with regulating cross-border activities, and (3) difficulty for some
Member States to effectively monitor and impose sanctions under the directive, especially since no
European case law had been presented yet under the new directive. I extensively compare MAD
and MAR and find the directive and regulation largely differ from one another. I also document
the changes to domestic law needed for several Member States to be compliant with MAR after its
4
implementation. Last, I show there are differences in insider trading behavior and market reactions
after the announcement, implementation, and publications of MAR enforcements.
Market Abuse Regulation
The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) of 2014 was the regulation that replaced the Market
Abuse Directive (MAD) of 2003. Previous literature finds that MAD had little to no effect on
insider trading behavior (Siems, 2008; Gȩbka et al., 2017). I make the case that MAR significantly
changed the landscape for insiders based on (1) the nature of a regulation versus a directive, (2)
the expanded scope of the regulation, (3) the increased oversight of the regulation, and (4) the
establishment of standardized administrative sanctions for violations of the regulation. Using this
evidence, I argue MAR is likely to have generated an exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading
in the EU.
Regulation versus Directive
The first major difference between these two pieces of legislation is the legally binding nature.
Since MAR is a regulation, it is legally binding in all the Member States of the EU. But MAD
was only a directive, which means it required Member States to achieve certain results, but each
Member State was given discretion on how to implement the directive into its own legislative code.
For example, MAD states the following:
The competent authority [of the Member State] may issue guidance on matters covered
by the Directive, e.g. definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on
commodities or implementation of the definition of accepted market practices relating
to the definition of market manipulation. This guidance should be in conformity with
the provisions of the Directive and the implementing measures adopted in accordance
with the comitology procedure.4
Furthermore, MAR states a major objective of the regulation is "to establish a more uniform and
stronger framework in order to preserve market integrity, to avoid potential regulatory arbitrage, to
ensure accountability in the event of attempted manipulation, and to provide more legal certainty
4MAD documentation can be found at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32003
L0006.
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and less regulatory complexity for market participants."5 Therefore, MAR shows promise for having
a more significant impact than MAD.
Expanded Scope
MAR significantly expands the scope of financial instruments covered as compared to MAD.
MAD did not address financial instruments trading on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), or-
ganised trading facilities (OTFs), or over-the-counter (OTC) that could have effects on the prices of
financial instruments. MAR explicitly states "the scope of this Regulation should therefore include
any financial instrument traded on a regulated market, an MTF or an OTF, and any other conduct
or action which can have an effect on such a financial instrument irrespective of whether it takes
places on a trading venue."
MAD supplies a definition of inside information as guidance for what Member States could use
in their legislation that includes the following:
(i) "Inside information" shall mean information of a precise nature which has not been
made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instru-
ments or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would
be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on
the price of related derivative financial instruments.
(ii) In relation to derivatives on commodities, "inside information" shall mean informa-
tion of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly,
to one or more such derivatives and which users of markets on which such derivatives
are traded would expect to receive in accordance with accepted market practices on
those markets.
MAR enforces an expanded definition to the one above, containing more specific information to
account for other financial instruments not covered under MAD. For instance, MAR added the
following to paragraph (ii) above to account for commodity derivatives and related spot commodity
contracts:
5MAR documentation can be found at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32014
R0596.
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...in relation to commodity derivatives, information of a precise nature, which has not
been made public, relating, directly or indirectly to one or more such derivatives or
relating directly to the related spot commodity contract, and which, if it were made
public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of such derivatives or
related spot commodity contracts, and where this is information which is reasonably
expected to be disclosed or is required to be disclosed in accordance with legal or
regulatory provisions at the Union or national level, market rules, contract, practice or
custom, on the relevant commodity derivatives markets or spot markets.
MAR also added provisions covering emission allowances or related auctioned products, detailed in
the quote below.
[I]n relation to emission allowances or auctioned products based thereon, information of
a precise nature, which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one
or more such instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the prices of such instruments or on the prices of related derivative
financial instruments.
MAR also provides a specific definition for information of a precise nature whereas MAD provides
no such definition. MAR establishes information of a precise nature to be information that indicates
a set of circumstances exist or are reasonably expected to occur or an event that has occurred or is
reasonably expected to occur that could have significant effects on prices of financial instruments,
related derivatives, related spot commodity contracts, or auctioned products based on emission
allowances. Moreover, MAR dictates that all steps involved in the protracted process that brings
about an event described above will also be subject to MAR. Thus, MAR created a uniform
definition for each of the Member States instead of allowing each Member State to establish the
definition as was done under MAD and effectively expanded the scope and scrutiny of trading in
financial markets in the EU.
MAR also expands the definition of insider dealing, also known as insider trading. MAD only
deemed insider dealing to be (1) disclosing inside information to any other person(s) unless this
information was disclosed through normal employment practices or (2) recommending any other
7
person(s) to obtain or dispose of financial instruments to which the information relates. MAR
adds to this definition (1) the cancelling or amending of orders concerning a financial instrument
or inducing others to do so using information pertaining to the financial instruments and (2) the
submission, modification, or withdrawal of a bid concerning auctions of emission allowances or
other auctioned products.
Oversight
MAR also introduced increased oversight of each Member States’ implementation and enforce-
ment of MAR. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) would be the central
regulatory authority concerning MAR. One major change was the requirement for market opera-
tors and investment firms operating an MTF or an OTF to report to its Member State’s competent
authority a list of all financial instruments admitted for trading, all financial instruments submitted
for admission to trading, when all financial instruments traded for the first time, and, if applicable,
the date the financial instruments stop trading. Then each competent authority was to collect this
same information about each financial instrument traded on regulated markets inside the Mem-
ber State and report to ESMA all the information collected on financial instruments traded on
regulated markets, MTFs, and OTFs.
The competent authority in each Member State would be responsible for establishing an ac-
cepted market practice subject to the detailed criteria in Article 13 of MAR. However, before
establishing the accepted practice, the competent authority must submit details to ESMA for re-
view, and ESMA will then provide a ruling as to whether the accepted practice threatens confidence
in the EU’s financial market. Furthermore, MAR requires the competent authorities review their
accepted practices at least every two years to determine if they need amending to account for
changes in the market environment. MAR also established the rule that the competent authority
of each Member State has an obligation to cooperate with each other and with ESMA. Particu-
larly, “[competent authorities] shall exchange information without undue delay and cooperate in
investigation, supervision and enforcement activities.”
MAR established rules for the appropriate process for delaying the disclosure of inside informa-
tion. Under MAD, each Member State was given discretion to determine the policy and process
8
by which inside information could be delayed. Under MAR, an issuer must satisfy the following
conditions in order to delay the disclosure of inside information:
1. The disclosure of the inside information entails a risk of undermining the financial stability
of the issuer and of the financial system.
2. It is in the public interest to delay disclosure.
3. The confidentiality of that information can be ensured.
MAR also requires the competent authority to reevaluate each case on at least a weekly basis to
ensure the conditions are still met. ESMA also plays a role here, providing the technical means for
delaying public disclosure of inside information to the competent authorities of each Member State
to ensure uniform standards for each case across Member States.
Under MAD, each issuer of financial instruments trading regulated markets was required to
publish lists of insiders privy to inside information. But each Member State could dictate what
information must be made public on these insiders. MAR requires issuers maintain uniform lists
of insiders who have access to inside information. This includes not just persons under direct
employment, but those performing tasks that grant them access to inside information, such as
lawyers and accountants. The list must include (1) the identity of the person, (2) the reason the
person is included on the list, (3) the date that the person was made privy of the inside information,
and (4) the date the insider list was created. Issuers with financial instruments trading or requesting
admission for trading on regulated markets, MTFs, or OTFs are all subject to this rule. Again,
ESMA is responsible for providing the technical means for each issuer to create uniform lists.
These uniform lists make it easier for competent authorities and ESMA to conduct investigations
of suspected insider dealing, increasing the scrutiny of each issuers’ insiders.
In investigating suspected cases of insider dealing, MAD established some measures the com-
petent authorities must have the right to take, such as carrying out on-site inspections, examining
existing telephone and data traffic records, suspending trading of the financial instruments, and
freezing assets. MAR expands on this list, adding the following measures:
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• Enter the premises of natural and legal persons in order to seize documents and data in any
form where reasonable suspicion exists;
• Refer matters for criminal investigation;
• Require telephone conversations, electronic communications or data traffic records held by
investment firms, credit institutions or financial institutions;
• Require, insofar as permitted by national law, existing data traffic records held by a telecom-
munications operator, where there is a reasonable suspicion of an infringement and where
such records may be relevant to the investigation of an infringement; and
• Take all necessary measures to ensure that the public is correctly informed, inter alia, by
correcting false or misleading disclosed information, including by requiring an issuer or other
person who has published or disseminated false or misleading information to publish a cor-
rective statement.
Each of the first four measures reasonably increases the level of scrutiny imposed on each insider.
The final point increases the potential cost for insider dealing since there could be loss of reputation
from having to publish a corrective statement. In summary, the increased oversight from ESMA
on the competent authorities and the increased scrutiny from competent authorities on insiders
supports the assumption that MAR generated an exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading.
Sanctions
MAD allowed each Member State to choose the administrative sanctions appropriate for viola-
tions of the directive. MAD simply states the following:
Without prejudice to the right of Member States to impose criminal sanctions, Mem-
ber States shall ensure, in conformity with their national law, that the appropriate
administrative measures can be taken or administrative sanctions be imposed against
the persons responsible where the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Di-
rective have not been complied with. Member States shall ensure that these measures
are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
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MAR established details about administrative sanctions for violations of the regulation. MAR
dictated the competent authority of each Member State establish rules that allow that authority
to impose at least the following administrative sanctions:
1. Order person responsible to cease actions.
2. Disgorge profits gained or losses avoided.
3. Issue public warning that indicates the person responsible.
4. Withdraw or suspend investment firm’s authorization.
5. Impose a temporary ban on person responsible from management functions in investment
firms.
6. Impose permanent ban if there are repeated cases of insider dealing.
7. Impose temporary ban on person responsible from dealing on own account.
8. Set maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least three times the amount of profits
gained or losses avoided.
9. Set maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions for insider dealing for natural persons of at
least EUR 5,000,000 or the corresponding value in the Member State’s national currency.
10. Set maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions for insider dealing for legal persons of at
least EUR 15,000,000 or 15% of the total annual turnover of the legal person or the corre-
sponding value in the Member State’s national currency.
In the event a sanction occurred under MAD, the competent authority was allowed the right
to publish the sanction but not required to do so. Under MAR, the competent authorities are
required to publish on their websites any decisions imposing an administrative sanction immediately
after the competent authorities have notified the person subject to the decision. Through these
publications, MAR aims to ensure the competent authorities make decisions that dissuade the
public from engaging the infringing activity. Also, MAR requires each competent authority report to
ESMA annually the aggregated information of all administrative sanctions and other administrative
measures the authority imposes. ESMA will then publish an annual report with the aggregated
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information from all the Member States. This effectively establishes a "one-stop shop" for market
participants to learn about the possible penalties for engaging in insider dealing or other forms of
market abuse. Thus, MAR effectively increases the scrutiny of each competent authority’s handling
of infringements and increases the perceived cost of insider dealing for other insiders.
As mentioned earlier, MAR introduced the requirement on the publication of imposed sanctions.
The regulation states
[C]ompetent authorities shall publish any decision imposing an administrative sanction
or other administrative measure in relation to an infringement of this Regulation on
their website immediately after the person subject to that decision has been informed
of that decision. Such publication shall include at least information on the type and
nature of the infringement and the identity of the person subject to the decision.
Additionally, the regulation requires these publications to remain online for five years and competent
authorities to publish details of any decisions on appeals of these sanctions. The majority of
competent authorities have added publications on MAR sanctions, which are relatively easy to
locate. For example, on the website for Sweden’s competent authority, Finansinspektionen, if
investors search for "sanktion" + "marknadsmissbruksförordning" (Swedish for "sanction" + "Market
Abuse Regulation"), they will find the list of published sanctions imposed on persons, both legal
and natural. On the website of Germany’s competent authority, BaFin, if investors search for
"MAR" + "administrative fine" - no need for German translation - a list of administrative fines
imposed under MAR result. On the website of France’s competent authority, the AMF, investors
can click on "News & Publications" and then "Enforcement Committee new releases" to read the
list of all the sanctions imposed in France.
In addition to the ease of finding these publications, investors can now see the amount of these
sanctions or fines, many of which are quite sizable. Finanssivalvonta, Finland’s competent authority,
imposed a 1,450,000 euro sanction on Afarak Group for insider dealing. The AMF imposed a
20,000,000 euro sanction on Morgan Stanley & Co International for market manipulation. They
also imposed a 10,000,000 euro sanction on Diana Holding for insider dealing. BaFin imposed a
1,275,000 euro sanction on Linde GmbH for market manipulation. Finansinspektionen imposed a
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25,000,000 SEK (2,476,472.07 euro) sanction on Capital Conquest AB for market manipulation.
These sanctions are not limited to legal persons. The AMF imposed a sanction on Rita Zniber,
the CEO and Chairperson of Marie Brizard Wine & Spirits, of 6,000,000 euros for insider dealing.
Financial Services and Markets Authority, Belgium’s competent authority, imposed a 107,841 euro
sanction on an anonymous individual for insider dealing. Finansinspektionen imposed a 2,400,000
SEK (237,806.96 euro) sanction for market manipulation.
Other Considerations
I focus on MAR’s impact on insider dealing regulation. However, MAR was not limited to
insider dealing, bringing about a multitude of changes for financial markets in the EU. Here I
highlight a few of the additional changes MAR enacted to illustrate the enormity of this regulation.
It formalized market soundings, which are, in essence, communications of information that occur
prior to the announcement of a transaction to gauge interest in the possible transaction. MAR also
detailed instances where market soundings are prohibited.
MAR also expanded MAD’s definition of market manipulation, the practice of sending false or
misleading signals about the supply of, demand for, or price of a financial instrument. MAR ex-
panded this much like it did for inside information, adding the spot market and auctioned products
based on emission allowances and adding manipulation of benchmark calculations.
Last, MAR also expanded scrutiny of managers’ transactions. MAD only dictated disclosure of
transactions that managers or persons closely associated with them conducted on their own account
concerning the issuer’s shares or related derivatives. Managers were to disclose this information as
soon as possible. MAR added debt instruments, emission allowances, and auction products related
to these allowances to the list of financial instruments that require disclosure and specifically stated
managers must disclose this information within three business days of the transaction. Similarly
to insider dealing, MAR applies to issuers trading on MTFs and OTFs in addition to regulated
markets. MAR dictates all the information that must be disclosed, to include the name of the
person, the reason for the notification, name of the relevant issuer, a description of the financial
instrument, the nature of the transaction, the date and place of the transaction, and the price and
volume of the transaction. MAR establishes a threshold of EUR 5,000 of subsequent transactions
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that must be achieved before the disclosure is required, a threshold considerably lower than many
Member States used under MAD. MAR even imposes a 30-day restriction on executing transactions
before interim financial reports or year-end reports. The final provision on managers’ transactions
ensures ESMA provide details on how to implement technical standards to ensure uniformity in
reporting across Member States.
Country Analysis
Since MAD was not legally binding and each country was allowed to write their regulations to
achieve at least the desired results from the directive, the case could be made that each country
had regulations that could have already accounted for the changes in MAR. I show this is not the
case by examining the changes several Member States made to their domestic regulations to achieve
compliance with MAR.
The French competent authority, the Autorité des Marché Financiers (AMF), published a report
to their website documenting the changes that would be needed to their current regulations to
be compliant with MAR.6 The AMF would need to account for the expanded scope of MAR
and include financial instruments traded on MTFs, OTFs, emission allowance auctions, and spot
commodities contracts. While AMF had already added financial instruments trading on MTFs to
their regulations prior to MAR, they would need to update their regulations to account for all the
other instruments now covered in MAR. The AMF also stated they would need to account for the
new definition of insider dealing that includes the instances of a non-insider executing a transaction
based on the recommendation of an insider given the non-insider knows the recommendation is
based on inside information. The AMF would also need to monitor market soundings as detailed
in MAR.
In establishing an accepted market practice, the AMF would need to update regulations to
expand the scope to include monitoring the activities of "experts" who produce investment rec-
ommendations. Additionally, the AMF would need to update the conflict of interest disclosure
requirement when producing investment recommendations. Prior to MAR, French law required
persons making investment recommendations to disclose conflicts of interests where any long posi-
6From article "Europe strengthens its market abuse regulations"
14
tion in excess of 5% of the total issued share capital of the listed company had to be included in the
financial analysis. Under MAR, any net long or short position exceeding 0.5% must be disclosed.
The AMF also comments on the need for increased transparency between it and the public in
establishing new accepted market practices as detailed earlier. The AMF also clarifies the absence
of a grandfather clause means all current accepted market practices established would need to be
examined and approved by ESMA.
MAR brought significant changes to French law concerning managers’ transactions. The AMF
would need to reduce the time frame for managers to disclose their transactions from five to three
business days. Additionally, French law would now have to include the new "negative window"
where managers cannot transact in the 30 days prior to publications of half-yearly and annual
reports.
The AMF would also need to update regulations on administrative sanctions. The AMF needed
to add the requirement that if profits or losses could not be determined from the infringing activity,
legal persons would be assessed sanctions of at least EUR 15 million or 15% of their total annual
turnover. Prior to MAR, the French law only explicitly included one of the seven criteria for
determining administrative sanctions, requiring the AMF to include the other six criteria. Prior
to MAR, French law did not allow the AMF to inform the public of the persons responsible for
the infringement which is now a requirement under MAR. New sanctions required to be added to
French law include (1) temporarily banning persons discharging managerial responsibilities within
an investment firm from dealing on their own account or performing management functions and (2)
permanently banning these persons from performing management functions in the event of repeated
infringements. The AMF would also need to add the offense of refusal to comply with an AMF
investigation to the actions subject to sanctions from the AMF.
The Italian competent Authority, Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB),
mentioned changes implemented in 2016 when MAR became effective in their 2016 annual re-
port. CONSOB stated MAR increased the number of relevant behaviors subject to scrutiny and
extended the reporting requirements of abnormal operations in the spot or forward commodity
markets. CONSOB stated that this extension requires increased monitoring of small scale parties
relatively less active on financial markets and other parties active in financial markets previously
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not monitored, such as insurance companies, proprietary traders, and buy side firms. CONSOB,
like the AMF, mentioned the need to start monitoring the activities of "experts" making invest-
ment recommendations and any possible conflicts of interest involved in the presentation of their
recommendations.
CONSOB also stated the new rules for inside information and delaying disclosure of inside
information replaced existing legislation when MAR became effective in July of 2016, specifically
highlighting new regulations on management of inside information, insider lists, manager operations,
and market soundings. Like the AMF, CONSOB notified ESMA of three accepted market practices
on market liquidity support, the purchase of treasury stock, and the repurchase of bonds at pre-
determined conditions that were established under Italian law prior to MAR. As mentioned before,
MAR required CONSOB to notify ESMA of these practices for ESMA to determine whether they
threatened the integrity of financial markets, whether they could be left in Italian law after MAR,
and whether any additional provisions need be specified for these practices.
Luxembourg’s competent authority for market abuse, Commission de Surveillance du Secteur
Financier (CSSF), documented on their website key changes resulting from the implementation of
MAR.7 The CSSF highlights the need (1) to cover financial instruments traded on MTFs and OTFs,
(2) require persons discharging managerial responsibilities (PDMRs) and people closely related to
them to disclose transactions traded on their own accounts no later than three business days after
the transaction takes place, (3) require issuers and anyone operating on their behalf submit insider
lists, and (4) require market operators, investment firms that operate a trading venue, and any
person professionally arranging or executing transactions to submit reports to the CSSF of any
suspicious trades, including the cancellation of trades.
The United Kingdom’s competent authority, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), issued a
policy statement entitled "Policy proposals and Handbook changes related to the implementation of
the Market Abuse Regulation (2014/596/EU)" detailing the changes to the current UK law required
to account for MAR. The FCA mention they repealed the part of their domestic law, the Financial
Securities and Markets Act (FSMA) of 2000, on the guidance for determining whether a behavior
is considered market abuse since it was not compatible with MAR. The FCA also mention the need
7Document can be found at https://www.cssf.lu/en/market-abuse/#documentation.
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to remove the clause that market abuse could only come from a regular user, a reasonable person
who regularly trades on the markets, in investments, or on auction platforms, widening the scope of
natural and legal persons subject to the new legislation. The FCA report that MAR would replace
their current definition of insider dealing and unlawful disclosure of inside information. MAR
also replaced the UK’s laws on the disclosure requirements of inside information and the delay
of such disclosures. The FCA also state the provision that "market makers and persons lawfully
dealing on their account and pursuing their legitimate business will not in itself amount to market
manipulation" must be removed from FSMA because it is too narrow in scope to compatible with
MAR.
In addition to these changes, the FCA’s annual report for the fiscal year ending on March
31, 2017 mentions MAR extends the obligations for firms and trading venues to begin reporting
suspicious orders in addition to transactions and attempted market abuse. This caused an increase
in the number of reports from 1,110 in the first six months of 2016 to 1,898 in the second six
months of 2016. The FCA also report a significant increase in the number of non-equity related
reports. These reports led to significant sanctions for natural and legal persons. The FCA used
their powers for the first time under the updated FSMA in March 2017 to require a listed company
to pay compensation for market abuse, requiring Tesco plc to pay £85 million plus interest for
misleading investors about its half-year profits. The annual report also states Mr. Dodgson and
Mr. Hind were sentenced to four and a half and three and half years in prison for Mr. Hind’s
trading on insider information that Mr. Dodgson provided him. In another case, Mr. Birk was
fined £163,000 for trading on insider information his neighbor gave him about a takeover of Logica
plc. As mentioned earlier, the publication of these harsher punishments are now required under
MAR.
Germany’s competent authority, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), de-
tailed the changes to German domestic law required under MAR in their 2016 annual report. BaFin
reports they needed to enact the German First Financial Markets Amendment Act to ensure the
German domestic code was compliant with MAR. The act includes extending monitoring to fi-
nancial instruments traded on MTFs and OTFs and the need for issuers of these instruments to
disclose inside information and publish insider lists. The act also extends the options available
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for imposing sanctions on infringements and makes it possible for secondary insider trading and
attempted market manipulation to be prosecuted as criminal offenses. The act also increases the
possible administrative fines for infringements, where these infringements can now be based on a
legal person’s turnover as mentioned earlier. BaFin states they will use the new legislation to im-
pose higher fines in cases of serious offenses, especially for larger firms with larger turnover. BaFin
provides the example that prior to MAR, they were only able to impose fines of a maximum of
EUR 200,000 but can now impose fines up to EUR 10 million, 5% of annual consolidated turnover,
or twice the economic benefit gained from the infringement. BaFin also state they will now have
the power to publish the details of each case under the new legislation as a measure to deter future
offenses.
Data
Insider Trading and Firm Data
Previous research studies the effect of insider trading regulations on insider trading profitability.
However, previous studies in international settings use proxies for insider trading to capture insider
trading activity. For example, Bris (2005) uses abnormal volume and price movements before tender
offer announcements as proxies for insider trading to show insider trading law enforcement from 52
countries increases the incidence and profitability of insider trading from 1990 to 1999. Tourani-
Rad et al. (2012) use price run-ups and abnormal volume data to show uncertainty avoidance
(individualism) is negatively (loosely) related to insider trading from 1990 to 2008. Using proxies
could bias results if they do not accurately measure what they are intended to capture. Ahern (2018)
finds most standard illiquidity measures are not statistically and economically robust predictors of
illegal insider trading, and those that were robust were only robust in the short-term.
I aim to alleviate the ambiguity of using proxies through using the 2iQ Global Insider Trans-
action Database which tracks global insider transactions. The 2iQ database traces over 10 million
transactions by over 500,000 insiders from over 60,000 stocks across 50 countries since 2000. This
database also covers each region of the world for an average of 12 years. In this study, I limit my
focus to European countries affected by MAR. 2iQ covers about 14,000 securities in Europe since
2000. I use buy and sell, unautomated, non-mechanical transactions that result in a change of
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ownership. I use transactions from years 2011 to 2019 to allow for three years of data before the
announcement of MAR and three years of data after MAR was effective. I also want to study the
insiders who are privy to sensitive firm information on which they could possibly trade. The 2iQ
data has a classification code for the type of insiders included in the data. I limit my focus to the
insiders with the following classifications: "A" - top insiders (executive board, chairman, top 5 in-
siders); "B" - upper level management (executive committee, top 20 insiders); "C" - non-executives,
supervisory board, and Board of Directors; and "D" - lower level executives.8
I gather firm-level data from Worldscope, including assets, debt, market value of equity, book
value of equity, and net income. I calculate Size as the log of assets in U.S. dollars, Leverage as the
ratio of debt to assets, return on assets (ROA) as the ratio of net income to assets, and Tobin’s q
as the market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity all divided by assets. I report
summary statistics on the number of firms and number of firm-transaction observations in Table
2 based on the filters on the 2iQ insider transactions and require the firm to have values for size,
leverage, and ROA. 9 My sample consists of 3,356 firms and 144,599 firm-transaction observations.
To examine the profitability of insider transactions, I calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal
returns (BHARs) for each transaction over 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month periods. I collect daily
stock price data from Datastream for these calculations and use the following for my calculation,
BHAR = ΠNn=0(1 + ret) −ΠNn=0(1 + ewret)
where N is set to 22, 65, and 130 for the approximate number of trading days in 1 month, 3
months, and 6 months, respectively. ewret is the equal-weighted return based on the returns from
the firms in the same country as the given firm. I also calculate the buy-and-hold returns using
a value-weighted return, replacing ewret with vwret. To capture the profitability of inside selling
activity, I multiply the BHARs for sell transactions by -1. I report summary statistics on buy-
and-hold returns for the firms in my sample in Panel A of Table 4.10 I report summary statistics
on firm-level variables in Panel C of Table 4. The control variables Size, Leverage, and ROA are
8my results remain consistent with the ones I present if I define insiders more generally than those defined above.
9Table 2 in Appendix
10Table 4 in Appendix
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three-year averages from 2011 to 2013 for each firm. I use these average values since MAR impacts
all firms at the same time and I wish to control for pre-treatment trends. To mitigate the effect of
outliers, I winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% level.
Published Sanctions Data
For each Member State in the EU, I search for sanctions on the competent authority’s website
related to MAR. I first search using the English version, if available, using combinations of key-
words "sanction", "fine", and "penalty" with "Market Abuse Regulaton", "MAR", "market abuse",
or "596/2014". I use "596/2014" because MAR is officially known as Regulation (EU) No 596/2014.
Once I collect the results from these searches, I then go to the native language version of the website
and search for the same combinations of keywords translated into the native language. Using this
search method, I find 294 sanctions from 11 countries. The other Member States may not have
published their sanctions since MAR does allow sanctions not be published if the infringement does
not jeopardize the stability of the financial market or the measure is minor in nature. Additionally,
ESMA released a report on the use of suspicious transaction and order reports (STORs) and com-
pliance of enforcement and sanctions related to these STORs.11 The report details several Member
States are only partially compliant - Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Iceland - and some are fully non-compliant - Cyprus and Liecht-
enstein - with the use of STORs and proper enforcement of sanctions. Therefore, I consider the
search results considerably return most of the sanctions that have been published on competent
authority’s websites. From these sanctions, I collect data on the person being sanctioned, whether
the person is a natural or legal person, the pecuniary amount, and whether the sanction was re-
lated to insider trading or market manipulation. For sanctions against natural persons, I collect
the name of the related legal person, if available. I use these legal names and search for them on
the Worldscope company data to find the ISIN number for the legal person.
11ESMA report "Peer Review on the collection and use of STORs under the Market Abuse Regulation as a source
of information in market abuse investigations"
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Market Reactions Data
I use Datastream daily stock price data to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around each enforcement and the announcement and effective dates of MAR. I use windows of 0
to +1 days, 0 to +2 days, and 0 to +3 days. I assume no information leakage about the sanctions
because competent authorities are required to immediately publish sanctions they impose on their
websites under MAR. I calculate the CARs using the market model where the benchmark is the
equal- or value-weighted return for the country in which the firm’s stock trades. I report the number
of firms and observations by country for the sample of CARs in Table 3.12 My sample contains
4,414 firms and 416,851 firm-CAR observations. I also report summary statistics of the equal- and
value-weighted CARs in Panel B of Table 4.
Univariate Results
First, I report the summary statistics of trading by time period in Table 5.13 I break the sample
into (1) the pre-announcement period, dates prior to April 16, 2014, (2) the post-announcement
period, dates on or after April 16, 2014 but before July 3, 2016, (3) the post-effective period, dates
on or after July 3, 2016 but before the first publication of a MAR enforcement concerning insider
trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades, and (4) the post-enforcement period, dates
on or after the date of the first publication of a MAR enforcement concerning insider trading in
the country in which the firm’s stock trades.
Next, I report the test for differences in means for insider trading profitability by period in Table
6.14 I largely find insider trading profitability decreases after the announcement, implementation,
and first enforcement of MAR. To illustrate, 1-month value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal re-
turns (BHARs) significantly decrease by 0.0067, 0.0110, and 0.0091 for the post-announcement,
post-effective, and post-enforcement periods, respectively, compared to the pre-announcement pe-
riod returns. This represents 58%, 96%, and 79% of the sample mean. I find similar results for
3-month and 6-month BHARs. I also test whether this difference is driven by buy or sell transac-
12Table 3 in Appendix
13Table 5 in Appendix
14Table 6 in Appendix
21
tions, splitting the sample into two subsets. I find that most results seem to driven by significantly
less profitable buying activity rather than selling activity.
One might wonder whether changes in trading activity drives this result. To test this possibility,
I aggregate the number of shares traded and the total number of trades for each firm by year and
by time period. I take the log of shares traded since this is a rather large number. I report the
sample medians of these trading activity variable in Table 7.15 Panel A (B) reports the statistics by
year (time period). I do not find any evidence of major changes in trading activity in this analysis,
except there seems to be less trading activity in the post-enforcement time period. This could be
that insiders are more fearful to trade in the post-enforcement period or that there is simply less
time in this period within my sample since a large number of enforcements didn’t occur until 2019
and my sample ends in the first half of 2020. Another concern might be that insiders trade only
when it is most profitable for them to do so after MAR. I analyze this by comparing the changes
in the log of shares traded across time periods by the top and bottom quartile of each measure
of profitability. I report the results in Table 8.16 I do not find any evidence that the changes in
trading period from the pre-announcement to announcement period, from the announcement to the
effective period, or from the effective period to the enforcement period are significantly different
for the high and low profitability groups.
Last, I test whether the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are significantly different from
zero for (0,1), (0,2) and (0,3) days around the announcement, implementation, and first MAR
enforcement concerning insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades. I report the
results in Table 9.17 I find evidence that the market reacts negatively to these events. For example,
the announcement (enforcement) value-weighted CARs average -19 (-41) bps for the event window
(0,1), which is statistically different from 0 above the 99% significance level. I also find some
evidence that equal-weighted CARs are significantly negative for the effective date and the first
enforcement, perhaps highlighting the market’s belief that insiders are more likely to be caught for
their malicious insider trading in the future.
15Table 7 in Appendix
16Table 8 in Appendix
17Table 9 in Appendix
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Conclusion
MAR brought about several major changes to the EU markets for the monitoring and pun-
ishment of market abuse, market manipulation, and insider trading. First, MAR is a regulation
that is legally binding for all Member States, replacing the previous directive, MAD, that only re-
quired Member States achieve certain results using their own interpretation of the directive. MAR
expanded the scope of financial instruments subject to monitoring. MAR established ESMA as
the central authority for monitoring the activity of each Member State’s competent authority’s
monitoring and enforcement actions. MAR significantly changed the sanctioning powers for the
Member States’ competent authorities, such as granting greater power to impose larger fines and
banning individuals from market participation. MAR also brought a list of other changes to persons
discharging managerial responsibilities and their participation in financial markets. Given all these
changes, I argue MAR creates a plausibly exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading in the
EU. To provide more evidence of this, I present univariate results that show insider trading prof-
itability significantly changed after the announcement, implementation, and enforcement of MAR.
Additionally, I show CARs around the announcement, implementation, and enforcement of MAR
are significantly negative, perhaps highlighting the market’s belief that insiders are more likely to
be caught for their malicious insider trading in the future.
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Chapter 2
Insider Trading Profitability and Culture
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Abstract
This chapter examines the effects of firm- and country-level culture on insider trading behavior.
To capture the effect, I examine differences in outcomes after the announcement, implementation,
and first enforcement of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) in the European Union (EU). Results
show that differences in culture lead to differences in insider trading profitability after MAR’s
announcement, implementation, and first enforcement. Insiders from high ESG firms tend to engage
in less profitable insider trading after the first enforcement of MAR. Insiders from high ESG firms
also tend to engage in more (less) profitable purchasing (selling) activity in the post-announcement
and post-effective periods. But these effect varies by firm size. I also study the "E" and "S" portions
of ESG and find these culture measures lead to differences in profitability in the post-MAR period.
Insiders trading in highly individualistic countries tend to engage in less profitable trading after the
first enforcement of MAR. Insiders trading in countries with high uncertainty avoidance and high




The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) of 2014 repealed and replaced the Market Abuse Di-
rective (MAD) of 2003 in the European Union (EU). This regulation brought major changes to
the monitoring and punishment of market manipulation and insider dealing, also known as insider
trading, for Member States in the EU which were legally binding rather than left to interpreta-
tion as was the case under MAD. First, the definition of insider dealing was updated to account
for additional behaviors that were not covered under MAD, such as trading on inside information
learned from an insider and the canceling or changing of orders. Second, the regulation expanded
the scope of financial instruments that would be monitored, including instruments traded on multi-
lateral trading facilities (MTFs), organized trading facilities (OTFs), and over-the-counter markets
and including commodity derivatives, auctions on emission allowances, and spot contracts. Third,
MAR increased the number of possible sanctions and increased the possible pecuniary amounts
that could be assessed for these sanctions. MAR also established the authority of the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) as the central governing body for monitoring the activ-
ities of each Member States’ competent authority to ensure MAR is properly enforced throughout
the EU. These are only some of the major changes MAR introduced, making it a rich environment
for studying how it affected the behaviors of insiders after its announcement, implementation, and
enforcement.
I focus on how insider trading behavior differed after MAR. In a world where preserving repu-
tation is becoming increasingly important to avoid losses to firm value, I study how MAR changed
insiders’ attitudes towards their inside trades since getting caught conducting illegal insider trades
could cause major losses to firm value. But this regulation effect could influence firms differently
based on culture. If a firm has poor culture, then it’s insiders might be less inclined to obey the new
regulation since reputation is already poor. Conversely, if these insiders perceive they will be more
likely targeted with investigations because of their poor reputation, then they could correct their
ways in the post-MAR period. On the other hand, insiders from firm’s with good culture could
be more fearful of getting caught because of the bigger risks to their reputation and carry out less
profitable trades in the post-MAR period. This could be especially true in recent times as investors
are more likely to factor firm culture into investment decisions. This has even caught the attention
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of regulators, where more disclosures around firms’ sustainability have become mandatory. The
European Union (EU) is leading the charge with their Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation
(SFDR) that was passed on November 27, 2019 and became effective in March 10, 2021. According
to an article from Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, this regulation requires firms to dis-
close on their websites how they account for "principal adverse impacts" from ESG risks and how
they perform due diligence in understanding those risks.18 The regulation’s purpose is to allow
investors to better understand and compare firm’s ESG approaches. The article further mentions
this regulation’s focus is on due diligence rather than simple disclosure, enforcing the importance
of proper ESG management. In this study, I aim to link firm culture to insider trading behavior. I
also aim to extend my analysis to country culture because these cultural norms can also influence
insiders and firms.
Using MAR as a plausibly exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading, I find firm-level
culture appears to have an impact on insider trading. Specifically, using equal-weighted returns,
I find insiders from high ESG firms engage in less profitable overall trading activity during the
post-enforcement period. But when I use value-weighted returns, I find high ESG firms engage
in more (less) profitable buying (selling) activity during the post-announcement and post-effective
periods. For the "S" portion of ESG, I find insiders from high socially conscious firms engage in less
profitable trading in the post-enforcement period and little difference in the post-announcement
and post-effective periods when I use equal-weighted returns. This result seems to be driven by
less profitable buying activity. I find insiders from high environmentally conscious firms engage in
more profitable buying activity in the all three periods. These results could suggest insiders from
high ESG firms are more concerned about preserving their reputation in the post-MAR period or
that low ESG firms are less concerned about reputational losses in the post-MAR period since they
already lack superior reputation, but this effect varies by type of trading activity and firm size.
Next, I study the effects of country-level culture on insider trading after MAR. I study three
aspects of country-level culture: individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and corruption. I hypothe-
size each of these measures captures a level of risk aversion that could lead to differences in insider
trading. Individualism measures the importance of looking after oneself rather than the collective
18Article titled "The EU’s Increasing ESG Regulation and its Implications for Business"
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group, meaning more individualistic insiders might be more willing to take risks to stand out from
the crowd and collect on profitable insider trades after MAR. Uncertainty avoidance measures how
important it is to avoid uncertain events, meaning insiders with high uncertainty avoidance could
avoid collecting on profitable insider trades after MAR to avoid the uncertainty of being accused of
illegal insider trading. Last, high corruption could mean insiders engage in more profitable trading
after MAR, not fearing the new regulation’s impact. I find the following: (1) high individualism
leads to less profitable trading activity in the post-enforcement period; (2) high uncertainty avoid-
ance leads to less (more) profitable buying (selling) activity in the post-enforcement period; and (3)
high corruption leads to more (less) profitability buying (selling) activity in the post-announcement
period but the effect flips in the post-enforcement period.
My main contribution is to the literature that studies the effects of firm- and country-level culture
on insider trading activity. Gao et al. (2014) show executives of CSR-conscious firms in the US
engage in less profitable insider trading. Skaife et al. (2013) show insiders engage in more profitable
insider trading when the "tone at the top" is one of weak internal controls. Chung et al. (2019)
show insiders from more tax aggressive firms engage in more profitable insider trading. Tourani-
Rad et al. (2012) show uncertainty avoidance (individualism) is negatively (loosely) related to
insider trading. However, a shortcoming of most previous international studies is the use of proxies
to track insider trading activity, such as abnormal volume, abnormal price movements, and price
run-ups, for insider trading (Bris (2005); Tourani-Rad et al. (2012)). As Ahern (2018) shows,
proxies for insider trading are largely not accurate measures of informed trading. To avoid this, I
use the 2iQ Global Insider Transaction Database which traces over 10 million transactions by over
500,000 insiders from over 60,000 stocks across 50 countries since 2000. Using this data and MAR
as a plausibly exogenous shock to the cost of insider trading, I show both firm- and country-level
culture lead to changes in insider trading profitability after MAR.
I also contribute to the literature on the effects of regulation on market outcomes. Fauver et
al. (2017) study board reforms from 41 countries and find these reforms increase firm value. Chen
et al. (2020) study international board reforms and find firms reduce cash holdings following these
reforms. Liu and Tian (2012) find firms with excess control rights have more leverage and their
controlling shareholders choose to tunnel rather invest in positive NPV projects after the Chinese
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non-tradable shares reform. Gȩbka et al. (2017) find the market abuse directive (MAD) had little
effect on insider trading profitability. Siems (2008) discusses the strengths and weaknesses of MAD.
Among the weaknesses are (1) the inability to impose sanctions for inside trades conducted on
unregulated markets, (2) the complicated process involved with regulating cross-border activities,
and (3) difficulty for some Member States to effectively monitor and impose sanctions under the
directive, especially since no European case law had been presented yet under the new directive. I
show little difference for when the regulation is announced or becomes effective, but enforcement
negatively contributes to insider trading profitability.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Firm-Level Culture
Previous literature studies the effects of firm-level culture on insider trading in the US. Skaife et
al. (2013) show insiders engage in more profitable insider trading when the "tone at the top" is one
of weak internal controls. Chung et al. (2019) show insiders from more tax aggressive firms engage
in more profitable insider trading. Gao et al. (2014) find insiders from US firms that are more
socially conscious profit significantly less than other insiders from US firms that are less socially
conscious. They posit CSR-conscious firms face negative costs to firm reputation if they engage in
profitable insider trading, an activity viewed as self-serving in nature.
Previous literature also finds insiders tend to engage in illegal insider trading through selling
rather than buying stock to avoid the negative consequences of holding a stock that will drop
in value in the near future. Kallunki et al. (2018) find less wealthy insiders time their insider
selling, and sell in greater volumes, to avoid price declines. Agrawal and Cooper (2016) find in
cross-sectional analyses that top managers sell substantially more of their stock holdings during a
misstated period.
Alternatively, firms with low ESG may be more concerned about the increased monitoring be-
cause of their poor reputation. Therefore, insider from low ESG firms may engage in less profitable
trading compared to their peers from high ESG firms after MAR. It is possible that this result is
driven by a reduction in profitability in selling activity given the previous research highlights the
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tendency for insiders to avoid larger losses rather than to obtain greater gains. Formally, I present
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Firms with high ESG scores have insiders who engage in less or more profitable
insider trading after MAR, where the result may be driven by a change in profitability of selling
activity.
I also study the environment and social portions of ESG to to study their individual effects
absent the governance portion of the score since these portions are receiving more media attention
in recent history.
Country-Level Culture
Country-level culture could also influence insider trading profitability. Tourani-Rad et al. (2012)
finds increased uncertainty avoidance is related negatively to insider trading, but individualism is
not strongly related to insider trading. I also explore this connection between these two measures
of country-level culture on insider trading profitability and also study a country’s corruption effect.
I hypothesize each of these measures captures a level of risk aversion that could lead to differences
in insider trading. Individualism measures the importance of looking after oneself rather than
the collective group, meaning more individualistic insiders are more willing to take risks to stand
out from the crowd and collect on profitable insider trades after MAR. Uncertainty avoidance
measures how important it is to avoid uncertain events, meaning insiders with high uncertainty
avoidance will avoid collecting on profitable insider trades after MAR to avoid the uncertainty of
being accused of illegal insider trading. I also study the effects of a country’s corruption culture
on insider trading profitability. Chen et al. (2020) finds accounting quality for firms is better
after corrupt officials associated with the firm is arrested. Lewellyn and Bao (2017) find corruption
positively correlates with earnings management. Liu (2016) finds corruption positively relates to
opportunistic insider trading where insider trading is measured using price patterns for the 20
trading days after purchase transactions. Given these findings, high corruption in the country
could mean insiders are less fearful of being caught for insider dealing. Thus, insiders from these
countries are likely to engage in more profitable insider trading after MAR when compared to
insiders from low corruption countries.
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Conversely, I can expect the opposite for each country-level culture measure. Cline et al. (2021)
find individualism leads to stricter regulation of insider trading because individualistic countries
favor market efficiency and financial development over personal gains at the expense of others.
Therefore, highly individualistic insiders could engage in less profitable trading after MAR, sup-
porting the regulation’s intentions to promote equality among investors in financial markets. MAR
could also have an effect on decreasing the ambiguity associated with being accused or caught in
illegal insider trading. Therefore, insiders from firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance
could engage in more profitable insider trading after MAR, being able to capture profits from their
legal trading that could have been accused as illegal before MAR. Last, more corrupt countries
could come under increased scrutiny from the new regulation that applies equally to all countries.
Therefore, fearing this increased scrutiny could lead to massive fines and publication of offenses,
insiders from more corrupt countries could engage in less profitable trading after MAR. Formally,
I present the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Firms located in countries with high individualism, high corruption, or high
uncertainty avoidance have insiders who engage in less or more profitable insider trading after
MAR.
Channels of Effectiveness
One might question whether MAR would cause any changes in insider trading in the equity
market. I present two possible channels for how this new regulation plausibly impacts trading in
the equity market. First, a main objective of MAR was to expand the scope of financial instruments
subject to the regulation as compared to the MAD. To avoid the increased oversight on these pre-
viously unmonitored financial instruments, insiders could substitute with equity trading to capture
gains from inside information, fearing the new regulation will sway competent authorities to focus
on the previously unmonitored instruments more than equity. If insiders from firms with low ESG
scores care less about possible reputational losses from their profitable insider trading, then these
insiders should engage in more profitable insider trading after MAR compared to insiders from
firms with high ESG scores. Additionally, if insiders from firms located in countries with lower risk
aversion - captured by high individualism, low uncertainty avoidance, and high corruption - care
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more about capturing gains despite the risk, these insiders should engage in more profitable insider
trading after MAR compared to insiders from firms located in countries with higher risk aversion.
Alternatively, the increased oversight in all financial markets could deter insiders from engaging
in profitable insider trading in the equity market for fear the new regulation would bring additional
scrutiny to the equity market as well. If insiders from firms with high ESG scores care more about
preserving reputation, then these insiders should engage in less profitable insider trading after MAR
compared to insiders from low ESG firms. Additionally, if insiders from firms located in countries
with higher risk aversion - captured by low individualism, high uncertainty avoidance, and low
corruption - care more about reputational losses than possible gains from insider trading, these
insiders should engage in less profitable insider trading after MAR compared to insiders from firms
located in countries with lower risk aversion.
Data and Methodology
Insider Trading and Firm Data
Previous research studies the effect of insider trading regulations on insider trading profitability.
However, previous studies in international settings use proxies for insider trading to capture insider
trading activity. For example, Bris (2005) uses abnormal volume and price movements before tender
offer announcements as proxies for insider trading to show insider trading law enforcement from 52
countries increases the incidence and profitability of insider trading from 1990 to 1999. Tourani-
Rad et al. (2012) use price run-ups and abnormal volume data to show uncertainty avoidance
(individualism) is negatively (loosely) related to insider trading from 1990 to 2008. Using proxies
could bias results if they do not accurately measure what they are intended to capture. Ahern (2018)
finds most standard illiquidity measures are not statistically and economically robust predictors of
illegal insider trading, and those that were robust were only robust predictors in the short-term.
I aim to alleviate the ambiguity of using proxies through using the 2iQ Global Insider Trans-
action Database which tracks global insider transactions. The 2iQ database traces over 10 million
transactions by over 500,000 insiders from over 60,000 stocks across 50 countries since 2000. This
database also covers each region of the world for an average of 12 years. In this study, I limit my
focus to European countries affected by MAR. 2iQ covers about 14,000 securities in Europe since
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2000. I use buy and sell, unautomated, non-mechanical transactions that result in a change of
ownership. I use transactions from years 2011 to 2020 to allow for years surrounding when MAR
was announced and became effective. I also want to study the insiders who are privy to sensi-
tive firm information on which they could possibly trade. The 2iQ data has a classification code
for the type of insiders included in the data. I limit my focus to the insiders with the following
classifications: "A" - top insiders (executive board, chairman, top 5 insiders); "B" - upper level
management (executive committee, top 20 insiders); "C" - non-executives, supervisory board, and
Board of Directors; and "D" - lower level executives.19
I also collect data on US firms to have a control group of firms. I collect data on US insider
trades from the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Feed. I focus on transactions that are open market
purchases or sells that are not tied to an option. I also focus on insiders that are directors, serve
on committees, or are officers in their firms.
I gather firm-level data from Worldscope, including assets, debt, market value of equity, book
value of equity, and net income. I calculate Size as the log of assets in U.S. dollars, Leverage as the
ratio of debt to assets, return on assets (ROA) as the ratio of net income to assets, and Tobin’s q
as the market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity all divided by assets. For my
US sample, I collect firm data from Compustat.
To examine the profitability of insider transactions, I calculate the buy-and-hold returns (BHARs)
for each transaction over 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month periods. I collect daily stock price data
from Datastream for the 2iQ sample and from CRSP for the US sample for these calculations and
use the following formula
BHAR = ΠNn=0(1 + ret) −ΠNn=0(1 + ewret)
where N is set to 22, 65, and 130 for the approximate number of trading days in 1 month, 3
months, and 6 months, respectively. ewret is the equal-weighted return based on the returns from
the firms in the same country as the given firm. I also calculate the buy-and-hold returns using
a value-weighted return, replacing ewret with vwret. To capture the profitability of inside selling
19My results remain consistent with the ones I present if I define insiders more generally than those defined above.
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activity, I multiply the BHARs for sell transactions by -1. The control variables Size, Leverage,
and ROA are three-year averages from 2011 to 2013 for each firm. I use these average values since
MAR impacts all firms trading in the EU at the same time, and I wish to control for pre-treatment
trends. To mitigate the effect of outliers, I winsorize all control variables at the 1% and 99% level.
Published Sanctions Data
For each Member State in the EU, I search for sanctions on the competent authority’s website
related to MAR. I first search using the English version, if available, using combinations of key-
words "sanction", "fine", and "penalty" with "Market Abuse Regulaton", "MAR", "market abuse",
or "596/2014". I use "596/2014" because MAR is officially known as Regulation (EU) No 596/2014.
Once I collect the results from these searches, I then go to the native language version of the website
and search for the same combinations of keywords translated into the native language. Using this
search method, I find 294 sanctions from 11 countries. The other Member States may not have
published their sanctions since MAR does allow sanctions not be published if the infringement does
not jeopardize the stability of the financial market or the measure is minor in nature. Additionally,
ESMA released a report on the use of suspicious transaction and order reports (STORs) and com-
pliance of enforcement and sanctions related to these STORs.20 The report details several Member
States are only partially compliant - Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Iceland - and some are fully non-compliant - Cyprus and Liecht-
enstein - with the use of STORs and proper enforcement of sanctions. Therefore, I consider the
search results considerably return most of the sanctions that have been published on competent
authority’s websites. From these sanctions, I collect data on the person being sanctioned, whether
the person is a natural or legal person, the pecuniary amount, and whether the sanction was re-
lated to insider trading or market manipulation. For sanctions against natural persons, I collect
the name of the related legal person, if available. I use these legal names and search for them on
the Worldscope company data to find the ISIN number for the legal person.
20ESMA report "Peer Review on the collection and use of STORs under the Market Abuse Regulation as a source
of information in market abuse investigations"
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Culture Data
I measure culture at the firm level and the country level. For firm-level culture, I use the Asset4
ESG data. I use the Asset4 A4IR score, which is a score that incorporates all measures of ESG.
Asset4 uses over 250 key performance indicators to calculate this score. More than 100 analysts
collect data from up-to-date publicaly available sources, such as annual reports, CSR reports, and
NGO websites, and use their experience to use the relevant data and make it comparable from one
company to another. I also use the social score and the environmental score to examine the "E"
and "S" portions of ESG as these aspects of firm culture have received increased media attention in
recent history. The social score incorporates employment quality, health and safety, training and
development, diversity, human rights, community, and product responsibility. The environmental
score incorporates resource reduction, emission reduction, and product innovation. I classify a firm
as high ESG, highly socially conscious, or highly environmentally conscious if the Asset4 A4IR,
social, or environmental score is above the sample median, respectively.
I obtain country-level culture data from Hofstede (2001), using the updated values provided in
2011. I use the measures based on the following: (1) individuality - the extent to which the society
believes one should only be responsible for his/her own well-being; and (2) uncertainty avoidance -
the extent a society feels threatened by uncertain situations. Each of these scores range from 0 to
100. I classify high individualism or high uncertainty avoidance as country scores above the sample
median in the respective category. I also obtain perceived corruption scores from Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This index aggregates data from numerous
reliable sources to measure the level of corruption in the public sector for each country based on
perceptions of business people and country experts. This score ranges from 0 to 100 where 0
indicates the highest level of corruption and 100 the lowest. I classify a country as highly corrupt
if the country’s score is below the sample median corruption score.
Methodology
I first want to determine if insider trading profitability changed after MAR, regardless of culture,
to provide preliminary evidence that MAR serves as an exogenous shock to the cost of insider
trading. Therefore, I test for univariate differences in insider trading profitability during different
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time periods for each measure of culture. I split the sample into transactions with trade dates
prior to April 16, 2014 (the pre-announcement period), trade dates between April 16, 2014 and
July 3, 2016 (the post-announcement period), trade dates on or after July 3, 2016 but before
the first publication of a MAR enforcement involving insider trading on the country in which the
firm’s stock trades (the post-effective period), and trade dates on or after the first publication
of a MAR enforcement involving insider trading on the country in which the firm’s stock trades
(post-enforcement period). MAR enforcements can apply to market abuse, market manipulation,
or illegal insider trading. Since this study focuses on the behavior of insider traders, I focus on
the events most likely to influence their behavior, namely the enforcements involving illegal insider
trading.
To test the effect of culture on insider trading profitability after MAR in a multivariate setting,
I employ a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) design as follows:21
BHARi =Ann +Ann ∗Culture +Eff +Eff ∗Culture +Enf +Enf ∗Culture
+Ann ∗Controls +Eff ∗Controls +Enf ∗Controls + ε
i indicates the month of the buy-and-hold return which can take a value of 1, 3 or 6. The firm-level
measures of culture are High ESG, an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an
ESG score above the sample median, High Soc, an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the
firm has a social score above the sample median, and High Env, an indicator variable that takes
a value of 1 if the firm has an environment score above the sample median. The country-level
measures of culture are High IDV, an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country
in which the firm’s stock trades has a Hofstede individualism score above the sample median,
High UAI, an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which the firm’s stock
trades has a Hofstede uncertainty avoidance score above the sample median, and High Corrupt,
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which the firm’s stock trades has a
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score below the sample median.
Ann is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the transaction’s trade date lies in the post-
announcement period and the country in which the firm’s stock trades is in the EU. Eff is an
21The first difference results from Ann, Eff, and Enf because these variables will only take a value of 1 for firms
whose stock trades in the EU and the second difference results from difference in culture measures.
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indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the transaction’s trade date lies in the post-effective
period and the country in which the firm’s stock trades is in the EU. Enf is an indicator variable
that takes a value of 1 if the transaction’s trade date lies in the post-enforcement period and the
country in which the firm’s stock trades is in the EU. I include firm fixed effects to account for time-
invariant firm characteristics and industry-year fixed effects to account for industry-time trends.
Last, I cluster standard errors by firm to account for correlations between firms. As I hypothesized
earlier, I anticipate firm- and country-level culture will lead to different responses to the stricter
insider trading regulation under MAR.
Results
I present univariate results in Table 10 using the EU sample.22 Panel A reports the difference
in means of insider trading profitability in the post-announcement period. It compares low to high
values for each culture measure. I find there are a multitude of significant differences for all culture
measures, providing preliminary evidence that culture caused insiders to trade differently in the
post-announcement period. Panel B (C) performs the same test during the post-effective (post-
enforcement) period. I continue to see significant differences between the two subsamples of culture
across all profitability and culture measures. As in Panel A, these results provide preliminary
evidence that trading activity differed in the post-effective and post-enforcement periods as well.
I also split my sample by whether the firm’s stock trades in a common or civil law country.
Since common law bases its rulings on precedent of similar cases in addition to the regulations in
place but civil law relies solely on the regulation in place, this measure of country-level culture
could lead to differences in insider trading profitability in the post-MAR period. In Table 11, I
report the summary statistics by type of law, where Panel A (B) reports results on the common
(civil) law firms.23 I only report the pre-announcement, post-anouncement, and post-effective
periods because there is only one common law country in the EU, the United Kingdom, and it
does not have an enforcement under MAR. It does appear there are differences between these two
subsamples. Therefore, I test whether there are differences in the means of these subsamples by
22Table 10 in Appendix
23Table 11 in Appendix
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period and present the results in Table 12.24 I find mostly that profitability is more negative for
firms trading under common law. This could mean insiders fear more scrutiny from regulators
under common law because it is not restricted to the regulation itself. I do not use this measure of
culture in later analyses because of the lack of enforcement in the United Kingdom.
My first multivariate test uses the Asset4 ESG score. I present the results in Table 13.25 Panel A
(B) uses the equal- (value-) weighted returns. I note that all tables have controls, but the results are
slightly stronger without them. In Panel A, I find no evidence of a change in profitability for insiders
from high ESG firms in the post-announcement and post-effective periods. But during the post-
enforcement period, I find insiders from high ESG firms engage in less profitable trading based on
1-month and 6-month BHARs. I find the announcement, implementation, and enforcement lead to
little changes in trading profitability. In Panel B, I find insiders from high ESG firms engage in more
(less) profitable buying (selling) activity in the post-announcement period and less profitable selling
activity in the post-effective period. To illustrate, 1-, 3-, and 6-month BHARs are 0.020, 0.053,
and 0.091 higher for buying activity in the post-announcement period, representing a difference
of 0.177, 0.271, and 0.330 standard deviations, respectively. The 1-, 3-, and 6-month BHARs are
0.023, 0.036, and 0.095 lower for selling activity in the post-announcement period, representing a
difference of 0.204, 0.184, and 0.344 standard deviations, respectively. I find no evidence of changes
in the post-enforcement period. In interpreting the results from Panel A in comparison to Panel B,
it appears firm size leads to different effects on insider trading profitability. For buying activity, I
interpret this result as insiders from low ESG firms being more fearful of detection in the post-MAR
period. Therefore, they engage in less profitable trading after MAR becomes announced to show
good faith to regulators and continue trading less profitably after MAR becomes effective and when
it is first enforced. For the selling activity, I interpret this result as insiders from high ESG firms
taking measures to avoid losses to reputation should they get caught in nefarious insider selling
since previous literature highlights that selling activity is more likely to be nefarious in nature.
Next, I examine the effects of social consciousness on insider trading profitability. I present the
results in Table 14.26 Panel A (B) uses the equal- (value-) weighted returns. In Panel A, I find
24Table 12 in Appendix
25Table 13 in Appendix
26Table 14 in Appendix
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insider from high socially conscious firms engage in less profitable trading in the post-effective and
post-enforcement periods, but little difference in the post-announcement period. This result seems
to be driven by less profitable buying activity. In Panel B, I find little differences in profitability
for all time periods. I interpret these results as insiders from high socially conscious firms are
interested in preserving their good reputation of fairness and equality. Therefore, these insiders
engage in less profitable trading during the announcement and effective periods because they do
not want to be caught engaging in an activity that promotes the well-being of one person at the
expense of others, which is in direct opposition of their firm’s reputation for fairness and equality.
But preserving reputation by decreasing profitability in their trades varies by firm size.
I also examine the effects of environment consciousness on insider trading profitability. I present
the results in Table 15.27 Panel A (B) uses the equal- (value-) weighted returns. In Panel A, I
find little evidence of differences in profitability during all three time periods. In Panel B, I find
insiders from high environmentally conscious firms engage in more profitable buying activity in the
all three time periods, but this result is only significant for 6-month BHARs. I also find marginally
significant results that these insiders engage in less profitable buying during the post-announcement
and post-enforcement periods. I interpret the results from Panel B as insiders from firms that are
highly environmentally conscious are less fearful of being caught in their buying activity, but are
more fearful of possible losses to reputation that could result from trying to avoid major losses.
Turning to country-level culture, I first test the effects of individuality on insider trading behav-
ior. I present the results in Table 16.28 Panel A (B) uses the equal- (value-) weighted returns. In
Panel A, I find insiders from firms trading in countries with high individualism engage in less prof-
itable selling activity during the post-announcement period, but no difference in the post-effective
period. I find enforcement itself leads to significantly lower profitability for selling activity. I find
high individualism leads to even lower profitability in the post-enforcement period, where this re-
sult is driven by lower profitability in buying activity. Panel B presents similar results as Panel
A, except the post-announcement results are no longer significant. This decrease in profitability
supports the hypothesis that high individualism leads insiders to favor market efficiency to capture
27Table 15 in Appendix
28Table 16 in Appendix
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gains or avoid losses from their trades rather than taking advantage of their information at others’
expense.
I then test the effects of uncertainty avoidance on insider trading behavior. I present the results
in Table 17.29 Panel A (B) uses the equal- (value-) weighted returns. In Panel A, I find evidence that
enforcement itself leads to lower profitability. I also find insider from countries with high uncertainty
avoidance engage in less (more) profitable buying (selling) activity in the post-enforcement period.
In Panel B, I find the same effect in the post-announcement period for selling activity, but the
result is no longer significant in the post-enforcement period. The more profitable selling activity
could mean the trading environment became more informative to investors on what constitutes
insider trading, meaning insiders can more effectively avoid losses from insider trades in legal ways
where they would have been fearful of being wrongly accused of illegal trading before MAR. The
less profitable buying activity could be interpreted from the perspective of the countries with low
uncertainty avoidance. Since these countries are less fearful of uncertain events, they could be less
fearful of the uncertain event of being caught engaging in illegal insider trading. Therefore, insiders
from firms trading in these countries could be less inclined to forego profits on insider trading in
the post-MAR period.
Last, I test the effects of corruption on insider trading behavior. I present the results in Table
18.30 Panel A (B) uses the equal- (value-) weighted returns. In Panel A, I find insiders from coun-
tries with high corruption engage in less profitable selling activity during the post-announcement
period and less (more) profitable buying (selling) activity in the post-enforcement period. In Panel
B, I find enforcement itself leads to lower profitability, but little difference based on corruption.
After the first enforcement, it appears insiders from firms trading in corrupt countries are less
fearful of being caught for illegal insider trading on the sell side and more fearful on the buy side.
Therefore, they are more willing to avoid losses and less willing to capture gains from their trades in
the post-enforcement period. But this result is likely driven by small firms since the equal-weighted
returns give more weight to small firms.
29Table 17 in Appendix
30Table 18 in Appendix
40
To mitigate concerns that these results did not occur in the post-announcement, post-effective,
and post-enforcement periods, I interact each measure of culture with year indicator variables and
with an indicator variable EU that takes a value of 1 if the country in which the firm’s stock trades
is in the EU. I present the results in Table 19 for high ESG scores.31 Ideally, I would find no evidence
of an effect in the years before MAR’s announcement. I find no evidence that profitability differed
in the year before MAR was announced. I find there are effects similar to those in Table 13 for the
years on or after the announcement, implementation, and enforcement of MAR. To preserve space,
I only tabulate the results for high ESG, but I find similar results for all other culture measures,
where the results are significant on or after MAR was announced and the results, if significant, in
the year before MAR was announced are marginally significant and are not consistent across all
profitability measures.
Conclusion
I study the effects of firm- and country-level culture on insider trading behavior. Since culture
is often endogenously built into the nature of the firm, I exploit the plausibly exogenous shock to
the cost of insider trading, the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). The regulation brought signifi-
cant changes to the EU regulatory landscape for monitoring and punishing market abuse, market
manipulation, and illegal insider trading. I study three important dates for the regulation, its
announcement on April 16, 2014, its implementation on July 3, 2016, and its first enforcement
involving illegal insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades. The firm-level
culture variables are ESG scores and the E and S (environment and social) portions of ESG. The
country-level culture variables are Hofstede individualism and uncertainty avoidance scores and
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores.
First, I find the announcement and implementation of the regulation led to little differences
in insider trading profitability, but the first enforcement contributes negatively to insider trading
profitability. For firm-level culture, I find insiders from high ESG firms engage in less profitable
overall trading activity during the post-enforcement period and more (less) profitable buying (sell-
ing) activity during the post-announcement and post-effective periods. But this effect varies by firm
31Table 19 in Appendix
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size. Using equal-weighted returns, I find insiders from high socially conscious firms engage in less
profitable trading in the post-enforcement period, but little difference in the post-announcement
and post-effective periods. This result seems to be driven by less profitable buying activity. I find
insiders from high environmentally conscious firms engage in more profitable buying activity in
the post-announcement period. These results could suggest insiders from high ESG firms are more
concerned about preserving their reputation in the post-MAR period or that low ESG firms are
less concerned about reputational losses in the post-MAR period since they already lack superior
reputation, but this effect varies on the type of trading activity and firm size.
For country-level culture, I find high individualism leads to less profitable trading activity in
the post-enforcement period, which could mean insiders from more individualistic countries favor
regulation that promotes market efficiency. I also find high uncertainty avoidance leads to less
(more) profitable buying (selling) activity in the post-enforcement period and high corruption
leads to more (less) profitability buying (selling) activity in the post-announcement period but the
effect flips in the post-enforcement period.
42
Chapter 3
Enforcement of the Market Abuse Regulation
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Abstract
This chapter examines the enforcement effects of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) in the
European Union (EU) on firm outcomes. Market reactions are significantly negative for the publi-
cation of sanctions imposed under MAR. This negative reaction is stronger when the enforcement
(1) involves illegal insider trading, (2) is against a legal rather than natural person, (3) imposes a
larger pecuniary amount, and (4) was conducted prior to COVID-19 pandemic. This effect differs
by firm- and country-level culture. Firm value increases after the first European Securities and
Market Authority (ESMA) publication of MAR enforcements for high ESG firms and high envi-
ronmentally conscious firms. I find no differences in firm value based on differences in country-level
culture or average firm insider trading profitability.
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Introduction
In 2011, the European Commission realized that an update to the laws on monitoring and pun-
ishing market abuse, market manipulation, and illegal insider trading was needed for the Member
States in the European Union (EU). The result was the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), which
was announced on April 16, 2014 and became legally binding for all Member States on July 3, 2016.
MAR brought significant changes to the regulatory landscape in the EU. MAR (1) expanded the
scope of financial instruments subject to the regulation, (2) established the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA) as the central authority for monitoring the activities of each Member
State’s competent authority, (3) redefined market abuse, market manipulation, and illegal insider
trading, (4) increased reporting requirements, and (5) increased the sanctioning powers of each
Member State’s competent authority. But does it matter to have a regulation in place if it is not
enforced? Enforcement is defined as the act of compelling observance of or compliance with a law,
rule, or obligation.32 Thus, I study market reactions to MAR enforcements to better understand
how these events affect firms. I also study how firm value responds after the first enforcements in
each country to understand how various firm characteristics contribute to firm value after these
enforcements.
When studying the market reactions of these MAR enforcements, I find the market reacts neg-
atively to these events. This negative reaction is stronger when the enforcement (1) involves illegal
insider trading, (2) is against a legal rather than natural person, (3) imposes a larger pecuniary
amount, and (4) was conducted prior to COVID-19 pandemic. For most of these characteristics, I
find the effect differs based on all measures of firm- and country-level culture.
Next, I study the effects of enforcement, culture, and insider trading profitability on firm value
in the post-enforcement period. I find that the first publication of an enforcement of MAR involving
illegal insider trading does not lead to significant changes in firm value. However, not all countries
publish the sanctions imposed under MAR. Therefore, I study the effects of the first publication
from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on MAR enforcements. This report
aggregates by country the number and pecuniary amounts of sanctions imposed from all the Member
States in the EU. It further breaks down the sanctions by infringement type, i.e. illegal insider
32Definition from Oxford English Dictionary
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trading or market manipulation. This report makes it easy for market participants to learn of
sanctions imposed. I find firm value for high ESG firms and high environmentally conscious firms
experience increases in firm value after this publication. I also find no differences in firm value
based on the profitability of insider trades during the post-effective period. Overall, I find that
culture does cause changes in insider trading behavior, market reactions, and firm value.
I contribute to the literature that insider trading regulations have greater impact once they are
enforced. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find the countries that have enforced insider trading
regulation have lower costs of equity than countries that have insider trading regulations but have
not enforced these regulations. Bris (2005) finds first-time enforcements of insider trading regulation
increases the incidence and profitability of insider trading. Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) find first-
time enforcements of insider trading laws improves price-informativeness. Jayaraman (2012) finds
first-time enforcement of insider trading laws in 16 countries contributes to significant increases
in timely loss recognition. Chen et al. (2017) find first-time enforcements of insider trading laws
improve capital allocation efficiency. I find these enforcement events exhibit significantly negative
market reactions and lead to changes in firm value based on firm-level culture.
I also contribute the the literature that studies market reactions to negative firm events. Aussenegg
et al. (2018) find the initial trading enforcement (ITE) contributes negatively to the CARs for in-
sider purchase transactions. Niessner (2013) find the disclosure of negative firm events contributes
negatively to the firm’s CARs and managers time their inside trades strategically when they dis-
close these events. Thevenot (2012) find significantly negative CARs around firms’ restatement
announcements. Song and Han (2017) find negative market reactions to the announcements of
corporate crime. I document significantly negative market reactions around the publication of
MAR sanctions where different characteristics of the enforcements amplify or mitigate the negative
reaction.
Last, I contribute to the literature that studies the effects of firm- and country-level culture on
firm value. Fauver et al. (2018) show firms with more employee friendly cultures are valued higher.
Zolotoy et al. (2019) show strong local religious norms in the area surrounding firm’s headquarters
increase the positive effect of CSR on firm value. Edmans (2011) shows a value-weighted portfolio
of the "100 Best Companies to Work for in America" earned significant four-factor alphas above
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industry benchmarks. Using several measures of both firm- and country-level culture, I find firm-
level culture has an effect on firm value after the ESMA publishes MAR enforcements.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Market Reactions
I expect the market to react to MAR enforcements. Aussenegg et al. (2018) find the initial
trading enforcement (ITE) contributes negatively to the CARs for insider purchase transactions.
Niessner (2013) find the disclosure of negative firm events contributes negatively to the firm’s CARs
and managers time their inside trades strategically when they disclose these events. Thevenot
(2012) find significantly negative CARs around firms’ restatement announcements. Since a MAR
enforcement can be reasonably assumed negative in nature, I expect the market reaction to be
negative around these events.
I also analyze other factors that could amplify or dampen this negative effect. First, since MAR
covers both market manipulation and insider dealing, I hypothesize if the enforcement involved an
infringement of insider dealing, then the market reaction will be more negative because this can
be viewed as a more nefarious crime. Second, MAR enforcements can be charged against the firm
or a person involved with the firm. I hypothesize that enforcements charged against the firm will
lead to more negative CARs since these fines detract from firm performance. Third, I hypothesize
the sanctions with larger pecuniary amounts will illicit more negative market reactions. Fourth, I
analyze the market reaction to enforcements during the COVID-19 pandemic. On one hand, the
market reaction could be more negative because investors view the firm in a more negative light
during a time of crisis. On the other hand, the market reaction could be less harsh during the
pandemic given how many firms have tried to assist their clients in new ways during this pan-
demic. Therefore, I hypothesize COVID-19 pandemic could contribute positively or negatively to
the market reaction. Fifth, I examine whether the country in which the enforcement occurred and
the country in which the firm’s stock trades is the same has an effect on the market reaction. I
hypothesize a stronger negative reaction will occur around these enforcements since investors are
more likely to read the publication of these notices, especially if they are published in the country’s
native language. Last, I examine whether the profitability of insider trading leads to differences in
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market reactions. Market participants could view the more profitable firms as more nefarious, be-
lieving they are engaging in illegal insider trading, leading to a more negative market reaction. But
market participants could view these firms as less nefarious because the more profitable trades are
most likely legal or they would not have transacted fearing the increased scrutiny from authorities.
I also examine how culture influences the market reactions around these MAR enforcements. I
hypothesize high ESG, high individualism, high uncertainty avoidance, and high corruption could
contribute positively or negatively to the market reactions around these enforcements. First, high
ESG could lead to less negative market reaction if investors believe these firms are not engaging
in illegal insider trading. However, high ESG firms engage in activities that do not promote
firm value, such as giving to charities and pursuing zero emissions policies. Therefore, the market
reactions could be more negative for these firms after MAR enforcements because investors perceive
these firms will engage in more spending to promote their ESG status to avoid detection of illegal
insider trading after these enforcements. Second, high individualism could lead to less negative
market reactions if investors believe firms will behave in line with the regulation going forward
in the promotion of market efficiency. However, the market reaction might be more negative in
theses countries to punish the firms for misbehaving and not promoting market efficiency. Third,
high uncertainty avoidance could illicit a less negative market reaction because investors believe
the firms will discontinue their illegal insider trading to avoid the uncertainty of getting caught.
But the market reaction might be more negative because market participants view this event
more negatively when it happens in a more informative regime on what would be punished as
illegal insider trading. Last, high corruption could lead to less negative market reactions if market
participants view enforcement as a positive event because the natural or legal person was not able
to bribe their way out of being sanctioned. But high corruption could lead to more negative market
reactions if these events reinforce the idea that firms are corrupt and engage in illegal activities.
Firm Value
If investors associate high ESG with a culture focused on working for the collective good rather
than serving individuals at the expense of others, then high ESG firms should also see an increase
in firm value after an enforcement under MAR. Conversely, firms with a high ESG culture could
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lead management to spend money on initiatives that take away from firm value. After a MAR
enforcement, firms may spend more to promote their ESG status to avoid scrutiny from authori-
ties, further decreasing firm value. Therefore, firm value could decline after a MAR enforcement.
Overall, the effect of the first MAR enforcement on firm value is ambiguous.
Like firm-level culture, country-level culture could influence firm value after MAR. If high in-
dividualism or corruption leads insiders to promote firm value to increase the profitability of their
trades, then high individualism or corruption should lead to increases in firm value after MAR.
On the other hand, if high individualism or corruption leads insiders to promote their personal
wealth over firm value, then high individualism or corruption should lead to decreases in firm value
after MAR. If high uncertainty avoidance leads insiders to avoid too much risk to remain safe, then
high uncertainty avoidance should lead to decreases in firm value after MAR. Alternatively, if high
uncertainty avoidance leads insiders to conduct profitable but legal trades in a more informative
environment, then high uncertainty avoidance should lead to increases in firm value after MAR.
Therefore, I hypothesize firms with high ESG or firms that trade in countries with high individ-
ualism, high corruption, or high uncertainty avoidance experience an increase or decrease in firm
value after a MAR enforcement.
Data and Methodology
Published Sanctions Data
For each Member State in the EU, I search for sanctions on the competent authority’s website
related to MAR. I first search using the English version, if available, using combinations of key-
words "sanction", "fine", and "penalty" with "Market Abuse Regulaton", "MAR", "market abuse",
or "596/2014". I use "596/2014" because MAR is officially known as Regulation (EU) No 596/2014.
Once I collect the results from these searches, I then go to the native language version of the website
and search for the same combinations of keywords translated into the native language. Using this
search method, I find 294 sanctions from 11 countries. The other Member States may not have
published their sanctions since MAR does allow sanctions not be published if the infringement does
not jeopardize the stability of the financial market or the measure is minor in nature. Additionally,
ESMA released a report on the use of suspicious transaction and order reports (STORs) and com-
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pliance of enforcement and sanctions related to these STORs.33 The report details several Member
States are only partially compliant - Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Iceland - and some are fully non-compliant - Cyprus and Liecht-
enstein - with the use of STORs and proper enforcement of sanctions. Therefore, I consider the
search results considerably return most of the sanctions that have been published on competent
authority’s websites. From these sanctions, I collect data on the person being sanctioned, whether
the person is a natural or legal person, the pecuniary amount, and whether the sanction was re-
lated to insider trading or market manipulation. For sanctions against natural persons, I collect
the name of the related legal person, if available. I use these legal names and search for them on
the Worldscope company data to find the ISIN number for the legal person.
Culture Data
I measure culture at the firm level and the country level. For firm-level culture, I use the Asset4
ESG data. I use the Asset4 A4IR score, which is a score that incorporates all measures of ESG.
Asset4 uses over 250 key performance indicators to calculate this score. More than 100 analysts
collect data from up-to-date publicaly available sources, such as annual reports, CSR reports, and
NGO websites, and use their experience to use the relevant data and make it comparable from one
company to another. I also use the social score and the environmental score to examine the "E"
and "S" portions of ESG as these aspects of firm culture have received increased media attention in
recent history. The social score incorporates employment quality, health and safety, training and
development, diversity, human rights, community, and product responsibility. The environmental
score incorporates resource reduction, emission reduction, and product innovation. I classify a firm
as high ESG, highly socially conscious, or highly environmentally conscious if the Asset4 A4IR,
social, or environmental score is above the sample median, respectively.
I obtain country-level culture data from Hofstede (2001), using the updated values provided in
2011. I use the measures based on the following: (1) individuality - the extent to which the society
believes one should only be responsible for his/her own well-being; and (2) uncertainty avoidance -
the extent a society feels threatened by uncertain situations. Each of these scores range from 0 to
33ESMA report "Peer Review on the collection and use of STORs under the Market Abuse Regulation as a source
of information in market abuse investigations"
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100. I classify high individualism or high uncertainty avoidance as country scores above the sample
median in the respective category. I also obtain perceived corruption scores from Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This index aggregates data from numerous
reliable sources to measure the level of corruption in the public sector for each country based on
perceptions of business people and country experts. This score ranges from 0 to 100 where 0
indicates the highest level of corruption and 100 the lowest. I classify a country as highly corrupt
if the country’s score is below the sample median corruption score.
Insider Trading and Firm Data
Previous research studies the effect of insider trading regulations on insider trading profitability.
However, previous studies in international settings use proxies for insider trading to capture insider
trading activity. For example, Bris (2005) uses abnormal volume and price movements before tender
offer announcements as proxies for insider trading to show insider trading law enforcement from 52
countries increases the incidence and profitability of insider trading from 1990 to 1999. Tourani-
Rad et al. (2012) use price run-ups and abnormal volume data to show uncertainty avoidance
(individualism) is negatively (loosely) related to insider trading from 1990 to 2008. Using proxies
could bias results if they do not accurately measure what they are intended to capture. Ahern (2018)
finds most standard illiquidity measures are not statistically and economically robust predictors of
illegal insider trading, and those that were robust were only robust predictors in the short-term.
I aim to alleviate the ambiguity of using proxies through using the 2iQ Global Insider Trans-
action Database which tracks global insider transactions. The 2iQ database traces over 10 million
transactions by over 500,000 insiders from over 60,000 stocks across 50 countries since 2000. This
database also covers each region of the world for an average of 12 years. In this study, I limit
my focus to European countries affected by MAR. 2iQ covers about 14,000 securities in Europe
since 2000. I use buy and sell, unautomated, non-mechanical transactions that result in a change
of ownership. I use transactions from years 2011 to 2020 to allow for years of data before the
announcement of MAR and after MAR became effective. I also want to study the insiders who
are privy to sensitive firm information on which they could possibly trade. The 2iQ data has a
classification code for the type of insiders included in the data. I limit my focus to the insiders with
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the following classifications: "A" - top insiders (executive board, chairman, top 5 insiders); "B" -
upper level management (executive committee, top 20 insiders); "C" - non-executives, supervisory
board, and Board of Directors; and "D" - lower level executives.34
I also collect data on US firms to have a control group of firms. I collect data on US insider
trades from the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Feed. I focus on transactions that are open market
purchases or sells that are not tied to an option. I also focus on insiders that are directors, serve
on committees, or are officers in their firms.
I gather firm-level data from Worldscope, including assets, debt, market value of equity, book
value of equity, and net income. I calculate Size as the log of assets in U.S. dollars, Leverage as the
ratio of debt to assets, return on assets (ROA) as the ratio of net income to assets, and Tobin’s q
as the market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity all divided by assets. For my
US sample, I collect firm-level data from Compustat.
To examine the profitability of insider transactions, I calculate the buy-and-hold returns (BHARs)
for each transaction over 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month periods. I collect daily stock price data
from Datastream for my 2iQ sample and from CRSP for my US sample for these calculations and
use the following formula
BHAR = ΠNn=0(1 + ret) −ΠNn=0(1 + ewret)
where N is set to 22, 65, and 130 for the approximate number of trading days in 1 month, 3
months, and 6 months, respectively. ewret is the equal-weighted return based on the returns from
the firms in the same country as the given firm. I also calculate the buy-and-hold returns using
a value-weighted return, replacing ewret with vwret. To capture the profitability of inside selling
activity, I multiply the BHARs for sell transactions by -1. The control variables Size, Leverage, and
ROA are three-year averages from 2011 to 2013 for each firm. I use these average values to control
for pre-announcement trends. To mitigate the effect of outliers, I winsorize all control variables at
the 1% and 99% level.
34My results remain consistent with the ones I present if I define insiders more generally than those defined above.
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Market Reactions Data
I use Datastream daily stock price data to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around each enforcement and the announcement and effective dates of MAR. I use windows of 0
to +1 days, 0 to +2 days, and 0 to +3 days. I assume no information leakage about the sanctions
because competent authorities are required to immediately publish sanctions they impose on their
websites under MAR. I calculate the CARs using the market model where the benchmark is the
equal- or value-weighted return for the country in which the firm’s stock trades.
Methodology
I study market reactions to the publications on these enforcement events. For each event window,
I first test whether the full sample of CARs are statistically significantly different from 0. I then
test whether the sample of CARs related to events of insider dealing enforcement are statistically
significantly different from 0. I also test whether the firms involved in the enforcements have CARs
statistically significantly different from 0. I then split the sample of CARs to perform several t-
tests on the differences in CARs between the two subsamples. I split by the sample median of the
pecuniary amount of the sanction, whether the event date was after the first COVID-19 lockdown
for the countries in my sample, whether the event was imposed on a legal person, whether the firm’s
mean insider trading profitability increased after MAR became effective, and by the sample median
of the firm and country-level culture measures. For each of these measures, I add the requirement
that the event occurred in the country in which the firm’s stock trades to determine whether the
results are stronger when there is a closer tie to the enforcement. I then use these different split
variables in a multivariate setting to determine which of these variable contribute to CARs. I use
the following OLS regression specification:
CAR (0, i) = Ctry + Split V ariable + Split V ariable ∗Ctry +Controls + ε
Ctry is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement occurred in the country
in which the firm’s stock trades. Split Variables include Inside, an indicator variable that takes a
value of 1 if the enforcement involves insider dealing, Legal, an indicator variable that takes a value
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of 1 if the enforcement is against a legal person, High Amt, an indicator variable that takes a value
of 1 if the enforcement has a pecuniary amount above sample median by country, and COVID-19,
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement date is after the first COVID-19
lockdown in the sample. Controls are lagged by one year prior to the year of enforcement and
include size, leverage, and return on assets.
I also test whether culture amplifies the determinant effect for each of these split variables in
following OLS regression specification:
CAR (0, i) = Culture + Split V ariable + Split V ariable ∗Culture +Controls + ε
Culture is one of the firm- or country-level culture variables as previously defined.
I then test whether firm- and country-level culture influence firm value after MAR. I employ a
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) design as follows:
Tobin′s q = Post + Post ∗Culture + Post ∗Controls + ε
Tobin’s q is the market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity all divided by assets.
The treatment group is identified using the measure of culture. The measures of culture are the
same for these tests as those used for the tests on insider trading profitability described above.
Post is in an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the trade date of the inside transaction is
after the first publication of a sanction in the country in which the firm’s stock trades. I include
firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm characteristics and industry-year fixed effects
to account for industry-time trends. I cluster standard errors by firm to account for correlations
between firms. I also test whether the profitability of insider trading influences firm value. I replace
Culture with a measure of insider trading profitability to determine whether MAR had an effect on




I study the market reactions of the published enforcements. The first test is determine whether
the mean of the CARs for all these events are statistically different from 0 for event windows
(0,1), (0,2), and (0,3) days around the event. I report thee results in Table 20.35 I find strong
evidence that the means of both equal- and value-weighted CARs are significantly less than 0 for
all event windows. The CARs are generally more negative when I only examine the CARs for
events that occurred in the same country as the country in which the firm’s stock trades. The
next test examines the CARs for insider dealing enforcements, and I report the results in Table
21.36 Again, I find the means of both equal- and value-weighted CARs are significantly less than
0. Furthermore, the means are more negative than for all the events.
Next, I split the sample by the pecuniary amount of the sanctions. For each country of en-
forcement, I split the events by high and low pecuniary amounts using the sample median. I then
merge this high amount indicator to the full sample matching on the event date and country of
enforcement. I report the results in Table 22.37 Largely, I find CARs are lower for events involving
higher sanctions, and the effect is intensified when the enforcement country is the same as the
country in which the firm’s stock trades. For the equal-weighted CARs where the country matches,
I find CARs are significantly different by 25, 26, and 30 bps for the (0,1), (0,2), and (0,3) CARs,
respectively, representing a 357%, 118%, and 70% change in the mean. The difference is larger
only for the value-weighted CARs when the country is the same as the country in which the firm’s
stock trades. Next, I split the sample by whether the enforcement date is after the first COVID-19
lockdown among the countries in the sample and report the results in Table 23.38 Since the test
uses the difference between the pre-period and post-period, the negative difference indicates the
CARs are significantly higher after the COVID-19 lockdown, possibly alluding to the belief that
firms will behave more appropriately after the enforcement, especially in a time of crisis. Next,
I split the sample by whether the enforcement was against a legal person and report results in
35Table 20 in Appendix
36Table 21 in Appendix
37Table 22 in Appendix
38Table 23 in Appendix
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Table 24.39 I find the CARs are significantly lower for enforcements against legal persons than
natural persons, where the difference is larger when the country is the same as the one in which
the firm’s stock trades. The next test for differences in means is to determine whether the firms
involved in the enforcements had CARs significantly different from 0. I report results in Table 25.40
I do not find any statistically significant differences, but this could be a lack of statistical power
since I have less than 50 observations. Next, I split the sample based on whether the firms inside
trades were more or less profitable after MAR became effective and before the first enforcement
and report the results in Table 26.41 I do not find any statistical differences in the means between
these subsamples.
The next set of tests split the sample based on the measures of culture. I report the results for
high Asset4 ESG, high social, and high environmental scores in Table 27.42 I find high Asset4 ESG
only has a significant difference for the value-weighted CARs when the country of enforcement is
the same as the country in which the firm’s stock trades, where high Asset4 ESG CARs are lower
since the difference is low to high ESG. I also find the high socially conscious and environmen-
tally conscious firms have less profitable CARs around publications of enforcements regardless of
the country in which the enforcement occurred. I report the results for high individualism, high
uncertainty avoidance, and high corruption in Table 28.43 Firms trading in countries with high
individualism (uncertainty avoidance) countries tend to have lower (higher) CARs. Again, the
coefficient on the difference is opposite the interpretation because it compares low to high for each
culture measure. Last, the results show no differences based on corruption.
I next examine the effect of these variables on CARs in a multivariate setting. I first present the
correlation matrix of these variables in Table 29.44 While the correlations are statistically signifi-
cant, they are relatively small for all variables except the culture variables. Given these results, I
use Inside, Legal, High Amt, and COVID-19 in the regressions and interact, one at a time, the same
country (Ctry) and each of the culture measures with each of these split variables. This allows me
to examine both the effect of the single split variables as well as the added effect of the same coun-
39Table 24 in Appendix
40Table 25 in Appendix
41Table 26 in Appendix
42Table 27 in Appendix
43Table 28 in Appendix
44Table 29 in Appendix
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try and culture on the split variables. Table 30 reports the results for the interactions with same
country.45 I find trading in the same country as the enforcement does not significantly contribute
to CARs. I find insider enforcement events have significantly lower CARs for equal-weighted CARs
for the (0,3) event window and value-weighted CARs for the (0,1) event window. This could mean
investors perceive illegal insider trading as more nefarious than market manipulation. For most
CARs, enforcements against legal persons have lower CARs, possibly meaning investors perceive
firms more negatively when they are directly tied to the infringement. CARs are significantly lower
for events carrying a high pecuniary amount, possibly meaning the market believes other firms will
be punished for their current actions. And CARs are significantly higher in the post-COVID-19 pe-
riod, possibly meaning investors are more forgiving for infringements during a time of crisis. When
I interact Ctry with Legal and COVID-19, the effect is amplified, indicating markets respond more
intensely the closer they are tied to the events. However, I observe the negative effect of inside
enforcement and high pecuniary amount is mitigated when in the same country, perhaps showing
the market’s belief that firms will correct their ways because they are more closely associated with
the firms that committed the infringement.
In Tables 31, 32, and 33, I find evidence that firm-level culture contributes to CARs.46 High
Asset4 ESG scores contribute positively to CARs when the event involves a high pecuniary amount
and charged against a legal person, possibly meaning investors perceive good culture firms will take
notice and not engage in illegal activities in the future. High Asset4 ESG scores also contribute
negatively to CARs when trading in the same country as the enforcement, perhaps highlighting
investors’ perceptions that there are other firms misbehaving. I find high social scores contribute
negatively to CARs during the COVID-19 pandemic, perhaps revealing the market’s belief that
infractions during a time of crisis are especially heinous and should be punished. I also find high
social scores contribute positively to CARs when involving a legal person, possibly showing the
market’s belief that other firms will correct their ways to preserve reputation. High environmental
scores contribute negatively to equal-weighted CARs after the first COVID lockdown and when
it occurred in the same country, possibly showing investors’ reaction to punish firms for taking
advantage of a time of crisis to capitalize on their trading or being more closely tied to infringing
45Table 30 in Appendix
46Tables 31, 32, and 33 in Appendix
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firm. I also find high environmental scores contribute positively to CARs when involving a legal
person, possibly showing the market’s belief that other firms will correct their ways to preserve
reputation.
For country culture, I report the results in Tables 34, 35, and 36 for individualism, uncertainty
avoidance, and corruption, respectively.47 I find high individualism amplifies the negative effect
of insider dealing enforcement and legal person enforcement, perhaps highlighting investors’ belief
that firms be punished for being anti-regulation when high individualism leads to a desire for
more regulation that supports market efficiency. High individualism also amplifies the positive
effect of high pecuniary sanctions and post-COVID-19 period, perhaps showing market’s belief
that firms will behave in the future to promote regulation that supports market efficiency since
they were enforced with a harsher punishment or during a time of crisis. High uncertainty avoidance
counters the negative effect from enforcements on legal persons. For the equal-weighted CARs, high
uncertainty avoidance amplifies the negative (positive) effect of trading in the same country as the
enforcement (enforcements with high pecuniary amounts). These results for uncertainty avoidance
support the notion that markets believe firms will correct their ways because it is more probable
the uncertain event of getting caught will occur. The most consistent results for high corruption are
that it contributes to positively to CARs for enforcements on legal persons and negatively to CARs
for enforcements during COVID-19 pandemic, mitigating the effects from these split variables.
This could be the market reacting to the belief that firms will behave in the future because the
enforcements happened rather than being bribed away.
Firm Value
I now study the effects of culture on firm value after enforcements. I first test whether the
first publication of an enforcement of insider dealing leads to differences in firm value after this
event. I find no significant results from this test. I find this result reasonable to understand
since not every investor is going to be aware of the enforcements, especially if the competent
authority’s website does not have an English version or a version in a language they can comprehend.
Therefore, I use the date of the first publication of the ESMA report on enforcements under MAR.
47Tables 34, 35, and 36 in Appendix
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The report is published in English, making it reasonably more comprehensible to the majority
of European investors. The report aggregates the sanctions imposed by country and details the
monetary amounts imposed on sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation separately. I
adjust my regression specification to the following
Tobin′s q = Post ESMA ∗Culture + Post ESMA ∗Controls + ε
where Post ESMA is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the date is after the first ESMA
report on MAR enforcements is published and the firm’s stock trades in the EU. I include my US
sample as a control group. I present the results in Table 37.48 For firm-level culture, the Asset4
ESG score contributes significantly to firm value after the ESMA report is published. It increases
firm value by 0.225, which represents a 11% change in the mean. This supports the hypothesis
that firms with high ESG have a culture focused on working for the collective good rather than
serving individuals at the expense of others, leading to increases in firm value after MAR. It is also
possible that low ESG firms contribute to reductions in firm value so their trades are less profitable
in the post-report period, fearing that if their transactions are too profitable they will more likely
be targeted for investigations because of their firm’s poor reputation. I do not find a significant
change based on social scores, but high environmental consciousness leads to increases in the firm
value. For country-level culture, I find no difference in firm value for all three measures culture.
The last test is to determine whether insider trading profitability contributes to differences in
firm value. Since MAR does not directly impact the workings of firms, MAR likely impacts firms
through its impact on insider trading behavior. Therefore, I calculate the mean insider trading
profitability in the period prior to MAR’s announcement and split the sample by the median of
these values. I also create an a measure that examines whether the firm’s mean insider trading
profitability decreased after MAR became effective. I first determine whether the mean for both
equal- and value-weighted 1-, 3-, and 6-month BHARs decreased after MAR became effective. If
the firm had at least two equal-weighted BHARs that decreased, then the firm was considered less
profitable for equal-weighted BHARs. If the firm had at least two value-weighted BHARs that
48Table 37 in Appendix
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decreased, then the firm was considered less profitable for value-weighted BHARs. I present the
results of the profitability effect on firm value in Table 38.49 I find little to no evidence of differences
in firm value based on these profitability measures.
Conclusion
Previous literature suggests the enforcement of a regulation matters more to market participants
than the regulation itself (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bris, 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009;
Jayaraman, 2012; Chen et al., 2017). Thus, I study the changes around the enforcement of the
Market Abuse Regulation in the EU. I study this regulation since it brought significant changes
to the EU regulatory landscape for monitoring and punishing market abuse, market manipulation,
and illegal insider trading. I am able to study these enforcement events because the regulation
required Member States’ competent authority’s to publish sanctions imposed under MAR to their
websites that must remain for five years.
When studying the market reactions of these MAR enforcements, I find the market reacts neg-
atively to these events. This negative reaction is stronger when the enforcement (1) involves illegal
insider trading, (2) is against a legal rather than natural person, (3) imposes a larger pecuniary
amount, and (4) was conducted prior to COVID-19 pandemic. For most of these characteristics, I
find the effect differs based on all measures of firm- and country-level culture.
I also study the effects of enforcement, culture, and insider trading profitability on firm value in
the post-enforcement period. I find that the first publication of an enforcement of MAR involving
illegal insider trading does not lead to significant changes in firm value. However, not all countries
publish the sanctions imposed under MAR. Therefore, I study the effects of the first publication
from ESMA on MAR enforcements. This report aggregates by country the number and pecuniary
amounts of sanctions imposed from all the Member States in the EU. It further breaks down the
sanctions by infringement type, i.e. illegal insider trading or market manipulation. This report
makes it easy for market participants to learn of sanctions imposed. I find firm value for high ESG
firms and high environmentally conscious firms, but does not differ based on country-level culture
49Table 38 in Appendix
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or profitability of insider trades. Overall, I find that culture does cause changes in insider trading
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
This table reports the definitions of variables used throughout the analyses.
Variable Definition
Time Periods
Ann Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the date is on or
after the announcement date of MAR, April 14, 2016, but the
before the date MAR became effective, July 3, 2016 and the
firm’s stock trades in the EU
Eff Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the date is on or after
the date MAR became effective, July 3. 2016, but before the
date of the first publication of a MAR enforcement involving
insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades
and the firm’s stock trades in the EU
Enf Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the date is on or after
the date of the first publication of a MAR enforcement involving
insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades
and the firm’s stock trades in the EU
Profitability Measures
i-Month EW BHAR The i-month equal-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal return
i-Month VW BHAR The i-month value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal return
CAR (0,i) The cumulative abnormal return from event date to event date
plus i days
Culture Measures
High Asset4 Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an
above sample median Asset4 ESG score
High Soc Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an
above sample median Asset4 social score
High Env Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an
above sample median Asset4 environmental score
High IDV Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which
the firm’s stock trades has an above sample median Hofstede
individuality score
High UAI Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which
the firm’s stock trades has an above sample median Hofstede
uncertainty avoidance score
High Corrupt Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in
which the firm’s stock trades has a below sample median Trans-
parency International Corruption Perceptions Index corruption
score
Enforcement Variables
COVID-19 Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement
event occurred after the first lockdown date in the EU




Ctry Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement
event occurred in the same country as the country in which the
firm’s stock trades
High Amt Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement
event had a monetary amount above the sample median by
country
Inside Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement
event involved illegal insider trading
Legal Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement
event involved a legal person
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Table 2: Summary Statistics - Country Buy-and-Hold Returns
This table reports summary statistics for the number of firms in each country and the number
of observations for each country. My sample includes all firms from the 2iQ insider transaction
database that were subject to the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). I exclude financial firms and
utilities (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 and 4949).




















UNITED KINGDOM 1099 22902
Total 3356 144599
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Table 3: Summary Statistics - Country Cumulative Abnormal Returns
This table reports summary statistics for the number of firms in each country and the number of
observations for each country. My sample includes all firms from Datastream that were subject to
the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). I exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC codes between
6000 and 6999 and between 4900 and 4949).




















UNITED KINGDOM 1138 98597
Total 4414 416851
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Table 4: Summary Statistics - Profitability, Market Reactions, and Firm
This table reports summary statistics for variables of interest. Panel A includes the summary
statistics for transaction-level variables, which include 1-, 3-, and 6-month equal-weighted and
value-weighted buy-and-hold returns (BHARs). Panel B includes the summary statistics of the
cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) with windows (0,1), (0,2) and (0,3) days around the event
date. Panel C includes the summary statistics of firm-level variables. Size is the log of assets in
U.S. dollars. Leverage is the ratio of debt to assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to assets.
Tobin’s q is the market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity all divided by assets.
Mean Percentile(25th) Median Percentile(75th) Std.Dev.
Panel A
1-Month EW BHAR 0.0123 -0.0458 0.0086 0.0644 0.1190
3-Month EW BHAR 0.0193 -0.0947 0.0099 0.1181 0.2356
6-Month EW BHAR 0.0203 -0.1558 0.0131 0.1845 0.3863
1-Month VW BHAR 0.0115 -0.0436 0.0058 0.0626 0.1130
3-Month VW BHAR 0.0198 -0.0816 0.0123 0.1092 0.1958
6-Month VW BHAR 0.0284 -0.1191 0.0213 0.1693 0.2761
Observations 150383
Panel B
EW CAR (0,1) -0.0007 -0.0145 -0.0007 0.0121 0.0364
EW CAR (0,2) -0.0022 -0.0188 -0.0011 0.0154 0.0480
EW CAR (0,3) -0.0043 -0.0228 -0.0015 0.0181 0.0612
VW CAR (0,1) -0.0006 -0.0142 -0.0007 0.0118 0.0357
VW CAR (0,2) -0.0010 -0.0183 -0.0012 0.0149 0.0441
VW CAR (0,3) -0.0016 -0.0222 -0.0017 0.0174 0.0513
Observations 321168
Panel C
Tobin’s Q 1.9831 1.0443 1.3869 2.1052 1.8500
Size 19.3526 17.6765 19.2141 21.0478 2.4636
Leverage 0.2072 0.0571 0.1816 0.3060 0.1793
ROA -0.0097 -0.0108 0.0332 0.0688 0.1781
Observations 14817
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Table 5: Buy and Hold Returns by Period
This table reports means and medians of buy and hold returns by period. Pre-Ann is the period
before MAR was announced (before April 16, 2014). Post-Ann is the period after MAR was
announced and before it was effective (from April 16, 2014 to July 2, 2016). Post-Eff is the period
after MAR was effective (on or after July 3, 2016) and before the first publication of a MAR
enforcement concerning insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades. Post-Enf
is the period after the first publication of a MAR enforcement concerning insider trading in the
country in which the firm’s stock trades. Panel A includes all transactions. Panel B includes only
buy transactions. Panel C includes only sell transactions.
Pre-Ann Post-Ann Post-Eff Post-Ins
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Panel A
1-Month EW BHAR 0.0101 0.0133 0.0138 0.0081
3-Month EW BHAR 0.0247 0.0239 0.0122 0.0092
6-Month EW BHAR 0.0310 0.0223 0.0088 0.0269
1-Month VW BHAR 0.0054 0.0121 0.0164 0.0145
3-Month VW BHAR 0.0113 0.0209 0.0267 0.0214
6-Month VW BHAR 0.0213 0.0264 0.0349 0.0431
Observations 51762 37159 57075 4387
Panel B
1-Month EW BHAR -0.0055 0.0006 0.0039 -0.0011
3-Month EW BHAR -0.0537 -0.0233 -0.0188 -0.0948
6-Month EW BHAR -0.1586 -0.0656 -0.0605 -0.3179
1-Month VW BHAR 0.0181 0.0149 0.0226 0.0289
3-Month VW BHAR 0.0298 0.0309 0.0405 0.0387
6-Month VW BHAR 0.0535 0.0523 0.0568 0.0615
Observations 27559 20100 34125 2505
Panel C
1-Month EW BHAR 0.0249 0.0282 0.0286 0.0204
3-Month EW BHAR 0.0979 0.0795 0.0582 0.1476
6-Month EW BHAR 0.2132 0.1260 0.1118 0.4858
1-Month VW BHAR -0.0055 0.0089 0.0070 -0.0048
3-Month VW BHAR -0.0050 0.0092 0.0061 -0.0016
6-Month VW BHAR -0.0064 -0.0041 0.0023 0.0186
Observations 28590 17059 22950 1882
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Table 6: Buy and Hold Returns - Differences in Means
This table reports the difference in means for buy and hold returns by period. Model (1) tests the means using all transactions from the
post-announcement period (April 16, 2014 to July 2, 2016) to the pre-announcement period (before April 16, 2014). Model (2) tests the
means using all transactions from the post-effective period (on or after July 3, 2016 and before the date of the first publication of a MAR
enforcement concerning insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades) to the pre-announcement period. Model (3) tests
the means using all transactions from the post-enforcement period (on or after the date of the first publication of a MAR enforcement
concerning insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades) to the pre-announcement period. Models (4), (5), and (6) test
the means using buy transactions from the post-announcement, the post-effective, and the post-enforcement period, respectively, to the
pre-announcement period. Models (7), (8), and (9) test the means using sell transactions from the post-announcement, the post-effective,
and the post-enforcement period, respectively, to the pre-announcement period.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ann - All Eff - All Ins - All Ann - Buy Eff - Buy Ins - Buy Ann - Sell Eff - Sell Ins - Sell
1M EW BHAR -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0020 -0.0065∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0048 -0.0030∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0048
(-3.97) (-5.06) (1.06) (-5.81) (-9.50) (-1.88) (-2.74) (-3.30) (1.73)
3M EW BHAR 0.0008 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗
(0.48) (8.72) (3.84) (-12.13) (-15.88) (8.89) (6.74) (17.82) (-9.09)
6M EW BHAR 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0041 -0.0771∗∗∗ -0.0822∗∗∗ 0.1752∗∗∗ 0.0680∗∗∗ 0.0822∗∗∗ -0.2919∗∗∗
(3.29) (9.57) (0.58) (-21.99) (-26.97) (20.17) (19.74) (25.91) (-30.91)
1M VW BHAR -0.0067∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0022 -0.0056∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0007
(-8.90) (-15.64) (-5.04) (1.93) (-5.53) (-4.70) (-14.26) (-13.08) (-0.29)
3M VW BHAR -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0116∗∗∗ -0.0098∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0036
(-7.35) (-12.59) (-3.20) (-1.03) (-6.61) (-2.19) (-8.30) (-6.74) (-0.81)
6M VW BHAR -0.0051∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0004 -0.0041 -0.0088 -0.0041 -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗∗
(-2.75) (-7.97) (-4.99) (0.15) (-1.70) (-1.44) (-1.64) (-4.40) (-4.32)
Observations 88921 108837 56149 45154 59179 27559 43767 49658 28590
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Summary Statistics on Trading Activity
This table reports statistics of trading activity. Panel A reports statistics by year. Panel B reports
statistics by time period. Pre-Ann is the time period before the announcement of MAR. Post-Ann
is the time period after MAR was announced but before it became effecive. Post-Eff is the time
period after MAR became effective but before the first MAR enforcement in the country in which
the firm’s stock trades. Post-Enf is the time period after the first MAR enforcement in the country
in which the firm’s stock trades. Ln(Shares) is the log of total shares traded. Trades is the number
of transactions.
All Transactions Buy Transactions Sell Transactions
Ln(Shares) Trades Ln(Shares) Trades Ln(Shares) Trades
Panel A
2011 11.51 6.00 10.56 4.00 11.67 3.00
2012 11.48 5.00 10.34 4.00 11.61 3.00
2013 11.83 6.00 10.31 3.00 12.02 4.00
2014 11.55 6.00 10.39 4.00 11.78 3.00
2015 11.54 5.00 10.34 4.00 11.74 4.00
2016 11.54 5.00 10.66 4.00 11.49 3.00
2017 11.73 6.00 10.63 4.00 11.59 3.00
2018 11.58 6.00 10.71 4.00 11.54 3.00
2019 11.70 5.00 10.75 4.00 11.81 3.00
Total 11.60 5.00 10.52 4.00 11.69 3.00
Observations 16284 13105 10099
Panel B
Pre-Ann 12.79 11.00 11.42 7.00 12.86 6.00
Post-Ann 12.34 9.00 11.13 6.00 12.32 4.00
Post-Eff 12.96 12.00 11.86 8.00 12.64 6.00
Post-Enf 10.34 4.00 9.64 3.00 10.93 3.00
Total 12.61 10.00 11.38 7.00 12.56 5.00
Observations 8101 6965 5709
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Table 8: Changes in Trading Activity by Profitability
This table reports the t-tests for differences in the changes in the log of the number of shares trades per firm by profitability. The test
compares the top quartile in profitability to the bottom quartile in profitability. Panel A compares the change in the post-announcement
period from the pre-announcement period. Panel B compares the change in the post-effective period to the post-announcement period.
Panel C compares the change in the post-enforcement period to the post-effective period.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EW 1M BHAR EW 3M BHAR3 EW 6M BHAR VW 1M BHAR VW 3M BHAR VW 6M BHAR
Panel A
Ann Change 0.0167 0.1637 0.2880∗ -0.2074 -0.2070 -0.0170
(0.13) (1.27) (2.06) (-1.66) (-1.63) (-0.13)
Observations 2088 1894 1791 2111 1972 1908
Panel B
Eff Change 0.0100 0.1413 0.0094 0.0994 0.0826 -0.0195
(0.08) (1.11) (0.07) (0.86) (0.68) (-0.15)
Observations 2343 2138 1996 2377 2184 2092
Panel C
Enf Change 0.0748 0.0927 0.1409 0.0865 0.1435 -0.1504
(0.26) (0.27) (0.43) (0.28) (0.43) (-0.41)
Observations 345 295 275 334 287 236
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: CARs - Announcement, Effective, Enforcement
This table reports t-test results on whether the CARs surrounding the announcement, implemen-
tation, and enforcemment are significantly different from 0. EW (VW) CAR (0,i) represents the
equal- (value-) weighted CAR starting on the event date and ending i days after the event date.
Announcement is the day MAR was announced, April 16, 2014. Effective is the day MAR became
effective, July 3, 2016. Enforcement is the date of the first publication of a MAR enforcement
concerning insider trading in the country in which the firm’s stock trades.
(1) (2) (3)
Announcement Effective Enforcement
EW CAR (0,1) 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0000 -0.0022∗
(3.58) (0.06) (-2.32)
EW CAR (0,2) 0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0013 -0.0014
(3.55) (-1.59) (-1.20)
EW CAR (0,3) 0.0020∗ -0.0006 -0.0109∗∗∗
(2.37) (-0.62) (-6.46)
VW CAR (0,1) -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0013∗ -0.0041∗∗∗
(-3.49) (-2.05) (-4.41)
VW CAR (0,2) -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0044∗∗∗ -0.0010
(-4.59) (-5.34) (-0.85)
VW CAR (0,3) -0.0027∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0025
(-3.26) (-4.32) (1.69)
Observations 8066 7990 2522
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: BHARs by Culture and Period
This table reports results from difference in means tests based on culture and time period. Panel A,
B, and C report the differences during the post-announcement, post-effective, and post-enforcement
periods, respectively. Each result tests the difference between low and high values of the culture
variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset4 ESG Soc Env IDV UAI Corrupt
Panel A
1M EW BHAR 0.0018 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ -0.0017 -0.0038∗∗
(1.05) (5.59) (2.73) (5.52) (-1.50) (-2.59)
3M EW BHAR -0.0294∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗ -0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0032 -0.0026
(-7.73) (-2.63) (-5.33) (11.62) (1.44) (-0.92)
6M EW BHAR -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.0135∗ -0.0357∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗ -0.0022 -0.0290∗∗∗
(-3.81) (-2.48) (-6.79) (7.01) (-0.63) (-6.52)
1M VW BHAR 0.0038∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0026 0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0047∗∗∗
(2.16) (4.26) (1.51) (0.20) (-1.21) (-3.35)
3M VW BHAR 0.0037 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0019 0.0042∗ 0.0052∗∗ -0.0002
(1.16) (3.37) (0.60) (2.20) (2.80) (-0.07)
6M VW BHAR 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0084 0.0002 -0.0078∗∗ 0.0007 -0.0130∗∗∗
(5.07) (1.79) (0.04) (-2.77) (0.26) (-3.76)
Observations 8316 8316 8316 37159 37159 37159
Panel B
1M EW BHAR -0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ -0.0057∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗ -0.0024∗ -0.0122∗∗∗
(-4.84) (6.49) (-3.32) (-10.12) (-2.30) (-9.89)
3M EW BHAR -0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗ -0.0041 -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.0045∗ -0.0259∗∗∗
(-3.95) (3.28) (-1.28) (-8.97) (-2.40) (-11.47)
6M EW BHAR -0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗
(-3.85) (5.94) (-3.11) (-8.32) (-7.06) (-11.60)
1M VW BHAR -0.0018 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0037∗ -0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0037∗∗
(-1.10) (9.86) (2.26) (-7.52) (2.90) (3.21)
3M VW BHAR -0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0041 0.0005 -0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0040∗ 0.0031
(-4.37) (1.51) (0.20) (-8.91) (2.36) (1.54)
6M VW BHAR -0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0065 -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0239∗∗∗ -0.0036 -0.0000
(-7.16) (1.69) (-5.31) (-8.64) (-1.53) (-0.00)
Observations 11460 11460 11460 57075 57075 57075
Panel C
1M EW BHAR 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0302∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0268∗ 0.0081 0.0063
(4.53) (2.09) (4.43) (2.01) (1.83) (1.42)
3M EW BHAR 0.1428∗∗∗ 0.1357∗∗∗ 0.1208∗∗∗ 0.0057 -0.0213 -0.0222
(6.73) (3.52) (5.08) (0.16) (-1.84) (-1.91)
6M EW BHAR 0.5627∗∗∗ 0.3156∗∗∗ 0.1867∗∗∗ 0.0039 -0.0481 -0.0507∗
(12.08) (3.56) (3.39) (0.05) (-1.95) (-2.06)
Continued on next page
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Table 10 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset4 Soc Env IDV UAI Corrupt
1M VW BHAR -0.0140∗∗ 0.0169 -0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0059 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗
(-2.82) (1.90) (-4.73) (0.52) (4.03) (3.96)
3M VW BHAR -0.0258∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ -0.0522∗∗∗ -0.0118 -0.0036 -0.0040
(-2.98) (3.58) (-5.49) (-0.64) (-0.59) (-0.66)
6M VW BHAR -0.0291∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ -0.0786∗∗∗ -0.0213 -0.0215∗ -0.0232∗∗
(-2.63) (3.88) (-6.53) (-0.82) (-2.49) (-2.68)
Observations 975 975 975 4387 4387 4387
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: BHARs by Common and Civil Law
This table reports results summary statistics of buy-and-hold-returns by common and civil law.
Panel A (B) uses observations from common (civil) law countries. Pre-Ann is the time period
before the announcement of MAR. Post-Ann is the time period after MAR was announced but
before it became effecive. Post-Eff is the time period after MAR became effective but before the
first MAR enforcement in the country in which the firm’s stock trades.
Pre-Ann Post-Ann Post-Eff
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A
1M EW BHAR 0.0124 0.0054 0.0114 0.0080 0.0209 0.0133
3M EW BHAR 0.0179 0.0070 0.0154 0.0132 0.0178 0.0095
6M EW BHAR 0.0246 0.0129 0.0139 0.0092 0.0163 0.0048
1M VW BHAR 0.0112 0.0019 0.0108 0.0047 0.0219 0.0113
3M VW BHAR 0.0136 0.0016 0.0169 0.0070 0.0227 0.0103
6M VW BHAR 0.0102 -0.0060 0.0188 0.0163 0.0250 0.0133
Observations 8357 5363 9599
Panel B
1M EW BHAR 0.0110 0.0070 0.0139 0.0124 0.0181 0.0165
3M EW BHAR 0.0213 0.0092 0.0222 0.0189 0.0183 0.0072
6M EW BHAR 0.0299 0.0144 0.0302 0.0340 0.0319 0.0261
1M VW BHAR 0.0034 0.0000 0.0119 0.0072 0.0165 0.0094
3M VW BHAR -0.0014 -0.0098 0.0167 0.0091 0.0282 0.0241
6M VW BHAR 0.0054 -0.0102 0.0284 0.0299 0.0441 0.0384
Observations 17851 12957 21429
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Table 12: BHARs by Common or Civil Law and Period
This table reports results from difference in means of insider trading profitability tests based on
common or civil law. Post-Ann compares the means of common to civil law during the post-
announcement period, the time period after MAR was announced but before it became effecive.
Post-Eff compares the means of common to civil law during the post-effective period, the time
period after MAR became effective but before the first MAR enforcement in the country in which
the firm’s stock trades.
(1) (2)
Post-Ann Post-Eff
1-Month EW BHAR -0.0025 0.0028∗
(-1.50) (2.09)
3-Month EW BHAR -0.0068∗ -0.0005
(-2.39) (-0.21)
6-Month EW BHAR -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0157∗∗∗
(-3.78) (-4.29)
1-Month VW BHAR -0.0012 0.0054∗∗∗
(-0.69) (4.04)
3-Month VW BHAR 0.0001 -0.0055∗
(0.05) (-2.41)
6-Month VW BHAR -0.0096∗ -0.0191∗∗∗
(-2.33) (-5.90)
Observations 18320 31028
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: BHARs and ESG
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating buy and hold returns and Asset4 ESG scores. The dependent variables are
1-month, 3-month, and 6-month buy and hold returns. Indepedent variables are defined in Table 1. Firm-level control variables are
the 3-year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC
industries. Models (1), (4), and (7) use both buy and sell transactions. Models (2), (5), and (8) use only buy transactions. Models (3), (6),
and (9) use only sell transactions. Panel A (B) reports results using equal-weighted (value-weighted) buy and hold returns. t-statistics
in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Ann -0.009 0.116 -0.034 0.182 0.216 0.220 -0.103 -0.072 0.149
(-0.16) (1.52) (-0.48) (1.24) (1.23) (1.36) (-0.44) (-0.21) (0.60)
Ann×High Asset4 -0.002 0.003 -0.008 0.025 0.019 0.033 -0.030 -0.015 0.001
(-0.23) (0.38) (-0.79) (1.18) (0.78) (1.40) (-0.89) (-0.31) (0.03)
Eff 0.005 0.062 -0.030 0.106 -0.102 0.237 -0.328 -0.514 0.059
(0.08) (0.71) (-0.45) (0.77) (-0.55) (1.55) (-1.57) (-1.61) (0.23)
Eff×High Asset4 0.007 0.015 -0.016 0.021 0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.014 -0.021
(0.90) (1.30) (-1.64) (1.07) (0.32) (-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.44)
Enf -0.244 -0.262 -0.179 -0.173 0.104 -0.178 -2.096 -0.289 -2.955∗∗
(-1.60) (-0.91) (-1.01) (-0.26) (0.14) (-0.32) (-1.50) (-0.26) (-2.00)
Enf×High Asset4 -0.041∗ -0.077∗ 0.023 -0.068 -0.139 0.195∗∗∗ -0.589∗∗∗ -0.272∗ -0.120
(-1.94) (-1.69) (1.14) (-0.88) (-1.41) (3.29) (-3.25) (-1.71) (-0.81)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Table 13 Continued
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.295 0.144 0.183 0.336 0.234 0.247 0.439 0.340
Panel B
Ann 0.038 0.095 -0.021 0.096 0.294∗ -0.091 -0.117 0.174 -0.222
(0.67) (1.08) (-0.30) (0.86) (1.84) (-0.64) (-0.61) (0.64) (-0.91)
Ann×High Asset4 -0.001 0.020∗∗ -0.023∗∗ 0.001 0.053∗∗∗ -0.036∗ -0.037 0.091∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗
(-0.14) (2.44) (-2.18) (0.07) (2.94) (-1.87) (-1.33) (2.72) (-2.56)
Eff 0.090 0.105 -0.000 0.128 -0.039 0.106 -0.107 -0.082 -0.074
(1.55) (1.14) (-0.00) (1.11) (-0.24) (0.78) (-0.56) (-0.29) (-0.32)
Eff×High Asset4 0.003 0.023∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.002 0.028 -0.046∗∗ -0.021 0.067 -0.069∗
(0.37) (2.21) (-2.97) (-0.12) (1.26) (-2.28) (-0.68) (1.61) (-1.86)
Enf 0.076 0.057 -0.043 0.375 0.504 0.088 0.507 -0.095 0.978∗∗
(0.55) (0.29) (-0.27) (1.38) (1.18) (0.29) (1.27) (-0.16) (2.01)
Enf×High Asset4 -0.012 0.006 -0.025 0.014 0.054 0.005 -0.042 0.012 -0.026
(-0.60) (0.15) (-0.92) (0.54) (0.75) (0.17) (-0.79) (0.14) (-0.36)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.278 0.128 0.183 0.311 0.237 0.252 0.408 0.329
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Table 14: BHARs and Social Scores
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating buy and hold returns and Asset4 social scores. The dependent variables are
1-month, 3-month, and 6-month buy and hold returns. Indepedent variables are defined in Table 1. Firm-level control variables are the 3-
year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC industries.
Models (1), (4), and (7) use both buy and sell transactions. Models (2), (5), and (8) use only buy transactions. Models (3), (6), and
(9) use only sell transactions. Panel A (B) reports the results using equal-weighted (value-weighted) buy and hold returns. t-statistics
in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Ann -0.046 0.089 -0.074 0.108 0.128 0.104 -0.048 -0.101 0.215
(-0.81) (1.14) (-1.09) (0.69) (0.69) (0.58) (-0.20) (-0.28) (0.86)
Ann×High Soc -0.014∗ -0.004 -0.020∗∗ -0.006 -0.008 -0.017 -0.008 -0.021 0.018
(-1.92) (-0.43) (-2.29) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.78) (-0.25) (-0.46) (0.52)
Eff -0.050 -0.033 -0.068 0.029 -0.332 0.215 -0.416∗ -0.750∗∗ 0.001
(-0.81) (-0.36) (-0.99) (0.20) (-1.50) (1.37) (-1.88) (-2.04) (0.00)
Eff×High Soc -0.010 -0.011 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.053∗ -0.018 -0.030 -0.077 -0.040
(-1.26) (-0.91) (-2.87) (-0.39) (-1.68) (-0.83) (-0.91) (-1.26) (-1.00)
Enf -0.174 -0.344 -0.313∗ -0.099 -0.012 -1.065∗ -0.381 -0.624 -2.883∗∗∗
(-1.12) (-1.24) (-1.71) (-0.19) (-0.02) (-1.92) (-0.31) (-0.60) (-2.90)
Enf×High Soc -0.063∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.017 -0.161∗∗ -0.206∗ -0.109 -0.333 -0.433∗∗∗ -0.372
(-1.82) (-2.38) (-0.49) (-2.19) (-1.75) (-1.26) (-1.49) (-2.74) (-1.25)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Table 14 Continued
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.295 0.144 0.183 0.336 0.234 0.244 0.440 0.340
Panel B
Ann 0.021 0.063 -0.022 0.106 0.220 -0.036 0.027 0.032 0.056
(0.36) (0.69) (-0.29) (0.97) (1.38) (-0.28) (0.16) (0.11) (0.25)
Ann×High Soc -0.007 0.011 -0.019∗∗ 0.004 0.030 -0.010 0.018 0.048 0.022
(-0.98) (1.17) (-1.97) (0.31) (1.51) (-0.48) (0.70) (1.33) (0.63)
Eff 0.066 0.003 0.016 0.130 -0.249 0.198 -0.137 -0.495 0.082
(1.11) (0.03) (0.23) (1.09) (-1.47) (1.37) (-0.67) (-1.56) (0.34)
Eff×High Soc -0.005 -0.005 -0.016 -0.002 -0.029 -0.010 -0.024 -0.045 -0.005
(-0.61) (-0.48) (-1.61) (-0.11) (-1.29) (-0.43) (-0.84) (-1.00) (-0.14)
Enf 0.083 -0.120 0.006 0.274 0.221 -0.026 0.637∗ -0.332 1.036∗∗
(0.72) (-0.60) (0.04) (1.32) (0.52) (-0.12) (1.68) (-0.56) (2.29)
Enf×High Soc -0.030 -0.057 -0.013 -0.044 -0.041 -0.042 0.002 -0.081 0.039
(-1.06) (-1.45) (-0.31) (-0.72) (-0.48) (-0.52) (0.02) (-0.85) (0.29)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.278 0.127 0.183 0.311 0.236 0.252 0.408 0.328
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Table 15: BHARs and Environmental Scores
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating buy and hold returns and Asset4 environmental scores. The dependent variables
are 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month buy and hold returns. Indepedent variables are defined in Table 1. Firm-level control variables are
the 3-year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC
industries. Models (1), (4), and (7) use both buy and sell transactions. Models (2), (5), and (8) use only buy transactions. Models (3), (6),
and (9) use only sell transactions. Panel A (B) reports results using equal-weighted (value-weighted) buy and hold returns. t-statistics
in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Ann -0.043 0.107 -0.046 0.087 0.088 0.208 -0.111 -0.083 0.205
(-0.74) (1.35) (-0.66) (0.56) (0.51) (1.23) (-0.45) (-0.24) (0.78)
Ann×High Env -0.011 0.001 -0.010 -0.010 -0.021 0.022 -0.022 -0.019 0.013
(-1.52) (0.14) (-0.98) (-0.46) (-0.95) (0.91) (-0.68) (-0.40) (0.33)
Eff -0.051 -0.005 -0.025 0.040 -0.153 0.292∗ -0.425∗ -0.462 0.076
(-0.87) (-0.06) (-0.37) (0.29) (-0.80) (1.89) (-1.93) (-1.43) (0.29)
Eff×High Env -0.009 -0.004 -0.012 -0.000 -0.005 0.008 -0.028 0.000 -0.027
(-1.18) (-0.33) (-1.28) (-0.01) (-0.16) (0.35) (-0.82) (0.01) (-0.63)
Enf -0.235 -0.099 -0.374∗ -0.143 0.507 -0.947∗ -0.305 0.620 -1.788
(-1.13) (-0.29) (-1.81) (-0.20) (0.56) (-1.69) (-0.17) (0.50) (-1.34)
Enf×High Env -0.059∗∗ -0.056 -0.030 -0.103 -0.030 -0.008 -0.134 0.001 0.250
(-2.32) (-1.26) (-1.44) (-1.39) (-0.37) (-0.11) (-0.64) (0.01) (1.44)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Table 15 Continued
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.294 0.144 0.183 0.335 0.234 0.244 0.438 0.340
Panel B
Ann 0.022 0.101 -0.020 0.083 0.218 -0.019 0.056 0.218 -0.020
(0.39) (1.12) (-0.28) (0.72) (1.38) (-0.15) (0.32) (0.82) (-0.09)
Ann×High Env -0.006 0.020∗∗ -0.017∗ -0.004 0.024 -0.004 0.028 0.090∗∗∗ -0.003
(-0.80) (2.54) (-1.66) (-0.28) (1.24) (-0.18) (1.03) (2.81) (-0.09)
Eff 0.057 0.050 0.021 0.112 -0.053 0.215 -0.065 0.020 0.048
(0.97) (0.54) (0.30) (0.96) (-0.32) (1.62) (-0.34) (0.07) (0.21)
Eff×High Env -0.007 0.006 -0.013 -0.007 0.021 -0.004 -0.003 0.088∗∗ -0.016
(-0.99) (0.59) (-1.63) (-0.47) (0.91) (-0.17) (-0.08) (1.99) (-0.43)
Enf 0.073 0.072 -0.100 0.369 0.527 0.002 0.651∗ 0.384 0.843∗
(0.45) (0.27) (-0.56) (1.15) (1.02) (0.01) (1.66) (0.75) (1.73)
Enf×High Env -0.019 0.006 -0.041∗ 0.022 0.093 -0.006 0.000 0.217∗∗ -0.051
(-0.96) (0.20) (-1.89) (0.67) (1.60) (-0.16) (0.00) (2.40) (-0.72)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.278 0.127 0.183 0.310 0.236 0.252 0.408 0.328
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Table 16: BHARs and Individuality
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating buy and hold returns and Hofstede individuality scores. The dependent variables
are 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month buy and hold returns. Indepedent variables are defined in Table 1. Firm-level control variables are
the 3-year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC
industries. Models (1), (4), and (7) use both buy and sell transactions. Models (2), (5), and (8) use only buy transactions. Models (3), (6),
and (9) use only sell transactions. Panel A (B) reports results using equal-weighted (value-weighted) buy and hold returns. t-statistics
in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Ann -0.017 -0.032 0.036 -0.027 -0.107 0.153 0.008 -0.166 0.259
(-0.75) (-0.93) (1.01) (-0.45) (-1.35) (1.56) (0.07) (-1.25) (1.37)
Ann×High IDV -0.012 -0.008 -0.026∗∗ -0.016 -0.019 -0.045∗∗ -0.021 -0.066∗ -0.051
(-1.51) (-0.90) (-2.31) (-0.64) (-0.98) (-1.99) (-0.50) (-1.71) (-1.28)
Eff -0.017 -0.026 0.022 -0.004 -0.051 0.147 -0.021 -0.122 0.186
(-0.72) (-0.75) (0.71) (-0.07) (-0.66) (1.54) (-0.19) (-0.97) (1.02)
Eff×High IDV -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.004 -0.024 0.004 0.004 -0.071∗ 0.007
(-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.75) (0.20) (-1.22) (0.13) (0.12) (-1.83) (0.14)
Enf -0.034 0.104 -0.246∗∗∗ -0.098 0.155 -0.301 -0.812∗ -0.245 -0.985
(-0.50) (1.18) (-2.93) (-0.53) (0.73) (-1.36) (-1.72) (-0.68) (-1.58)
Enf×High IDV -0.090∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.066∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.251∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗ 0.227∗
(-3.23) (-3.23) (-1.76) (-3.10) (-4.35) (0.18) (-2.89) (-6.00) (1.82)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Table 16 Continued
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.225 0.161 0.177 0.286 0.263 0.226 0.377 0.346
Panel B
Ann -0.017 -0.034 0.073∗∗ -0.020 -0.038 0.159∗∗ -0.040 0.032 0.125
(-0.73) (-1.02) (2.30) (-0.44) (-0.55) (2.50) (-0.54) (0.29) (1.14)
Ann×High IDV -0.008 0.002 -0.017 -0.011 -0.013 0.003 0.003 -0.019 0.024
(-1.15) (0.19) (-1.54) (-0.93) (-0.69) (0.17) (0.17) (-0.61) (0.82)
Eff -0.013 -0.037 0.059∗∗ -0.044 -0.093 0.165∗∗∗ -0.068 -0.051 0.193∗∗
(-0.54) (-1.06) (2.01) (-0.94) (-1.32) (2.72) (-0.89) (-0.44) (2.00)
Eff×High IDV 0.003 0.009 -0.009 0.013 -0.002 0.015 0.044∗∗ 0.015 0.017
(0.41) (0.96) (-1.02) (0.99) (-0.14) (0.77) (1.97) (0.48) (0.56)
Enf -0.081 -0.056 -0.171∗∗ -0.051 -0.085 0.033 0.009 0.156 -0.126
(-1.38) (-0.71) (-2.46) (-0.54) (-0.52) (0.18) (0.06) (0.72) (-0.56)
Enf×High IDV -0.057∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.054 -0.059∗ -0.101 -0.001 -0.087∗ -0.107 -0.030
(-2.16) (-2.15) (-1.56) (-1.80) (-1.56) (-0.02) (-1.75) (-1.54) (-0.42)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.224 0.144 0.184 0.281 0.246 0.239 0.369 0.337
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Table 17: BHARs and Uncertainty Avoidance
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating buy and hold returns and Hofstede uncertainty avoidance scores. The dependent
variables are 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month buy and hold returns. Indepedent variables are defined in Table 1. Firm-level control
variables are the 3-year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry fixed effects are based on
2-digit SIC industries. Models (1), (4), and (7) use both buy and sell transactions. Models (2), (5), and (8) use only buy transactions.
Models (3), (6), and (9) use only sell transactions. Panel A (B) reports results using equal-weighted (value-weighted) buy and hold
returns. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Ann -0.017 -0.044 0.043 -0.024 -0.148∗ 0.191∗∗ -0.005 -0.306∗∗ 0.328∗
(-0.81) (-1.36) (1.31) (-0.43) (-1.92) (2.08) (-0.05) (-2.35) (1.88)
Ann×High UAI 0.000 0.011 -0.001 -0.004 0.036∗∗ -0.030 0.016 0.124∗∗∗ -0.062∗
(0.07) (1.51) (-0.14) (-0.21) (2.23) (-1.47) (0.50) (3.94) (-1.83)
Eff -0.009 -0.022 0.033 0.007 -0.067 0.178∗ -0.015 -0.202∗ 0.253
(-0.39) (-0.66) (1.05) (0.12) (-0.89) (1.89) (-0.14) (-1.65) (1.44)
Eff×High UAI -0.010∗ -0.005 -0.003 -0.012 0.012 -0.013 -0.005 0.069∗∗ -0.047
(-1.84) (-0.69) (-0.35) (-0.76) (0.74) (-0.67) (-0.18) (2.11) (-1.42)
Enf -0.088 0.039 -0.270∗∗∗ -0.193 0.095 -0.286 -1.029∗∗ -0.343 -0.870
(-1.36) (0.48) (-3.12) (-0.98) (0.50) (-1.18) (-2.10) (-1.06) (-1.41)
Enf×High UAI -0.036∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.007 -0.156∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.470∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(-3.01) (-2.84) (-1.29) (-0.18) (-3.89) (3.07) (0.20) (-6.25) (4.83)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Table 17 Continued
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.225 0.161 0.177 0.287 0.263 0.226 0.381 0.347
Panel B
Ann -0.023 -0.023 0.058∗ -0.031 -0.021 0.137∗∗ -0.059 0.060 0.083
(-1.07) (-0.74) (1.88) (-0.71) (-0.32) (2.25) (-0.81) (0.56) (0.79)
Ann×High UAI 0.008 -0.009 0.024∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.017 0.025∗ 0.020 -0.026 0.043∗
(1.45) (-1.34) (2.97) (1.30) (-1.13) (1.71) (1.19) (-1.07) (1.78)
Eff -0.009 -0.023 0.052∗ -0.047 -0.089 0.147∗∗ -0.073 -0.032 0.157
(-0.39) (-0.67) (1.77) (-1.02) (-1.29) (2.43) (-0.96) (-0.27) (1.63)
Eff×High UAI -0.005 -0.012 0.015∗∗ 0.006 -0.002 0.024∗ 0.005 -0.012 0.037∗
(-0.96) (-1.61) (2.38) (0.54) (-0.12) (1.82) (0.30) (-0.45) (1.69)
Enf -0.118∗∗ -0.112 -0.193∗∗∗ -0.114 -0.155 0.016 -0.103 0.074 -0.169
(-2.13) (-1.55) (-2.73) (-1.18) (-0.91) (0.09) (-0.69) (0.32) (-0.71)
Enf×High UAI -0.021∗ -0.020 -0.021 0.014 -0.024 0.075∗∗ 0.022 -0.020 0.041
(-1.94) (-1.39) (-1.11) (0.62) (-0.76) (2.12) (0.62) (-0.41) (0.69)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.224 0.144 0.184 0.281 0.246 0.239 0.368 0.337
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Table 18: BHARs and Corruption
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating buy and hold returns and corruption scores from Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The dependent variables are 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month buy and hold returns. Indepedent
variables are defined in Table 1. Firm-level control variables are the 3-year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA,
and Leverage. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC industries. Models (1), (4), and (7) use both buy and sell transactions.
Models (2), (5), and (8) use only buy transactions. Models (3), (6), and (9) use only sell transactions. Panel A (B) reports results using
equal-weighted (value-weighted) buy and hold returns. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Ann -0.017 -0.032 0.035 -0.028 -0.109 0.142 0.014 -0.169 0.233
(-0.76) (-0.94) (0.99) (-0.46) (-1.35) (1.43) (0.12) (-1.25) (1.21)
Ann×High Corrupt -0.002 0.009 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.003 0.037 -0.065∗∗∗ 0.019 0.109∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(-0.45) (1.08) (-2.58) (-0.18) (1.61) (-3.75) (0.64) (2.50) (-3.92)
Eff -0.016 -0.026 0.024 0.005 -0.052 0.149 -0.011 -0.127 0.169
(-0.65) (-0.75) (0.75) (0.08) (-0.68) (1.52) (-0.10) (-1.03) (0.89)
Eff×High Corrupt -0.001 0.006 -0.012∗ 0.017 0.031 -0.027 0.018 0.076∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(-0.10) (0.53) (-1.75) (1.22) (1.35) (-1.51) (0.66) (1.71) (-3.05)
Enf -0.092 0.030 -0.282∗∗∗ -0.190 0.096 -0.323 -1.021∗∗ -0.311 -0.977
(-1.42) (0.36) (-3.25) (-0.96) (0.50) (-1.33) (-2.08) (-0.97) (-1.59)
Enf×High Corrupt -0.029∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.035∗ 0.010 -0.142∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.461∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(-2.46) (-2.07) (-1.77) (0.25) (-3.37) (2.86) (0.45) (-6.06) (4.53)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Table 18 Continued
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.225 0.161 0.177 0.287 0.263 0.226 0.380 0.347
Panel B
Ann -0.016 -0.033 0.077∗∗ -0.019 -0.038 0.155∗∗ -0.036 0.039 0.121
(-0.68) (-1.00) (2.28) (-0.43) (-0.54) (2.46) (-0.48) (0.34) (1.10)
Ann×High Corrupt 0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.009 -0.010 0.023 0.031 0.003
(0.50) (0.83) (-0.39) (0.25) (0.37) (-0.69) (1.12) (0.82) (0.13)
Eff -0.012 -0.035 0.064∗∗ -0.037 -0.094 0.169∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.057 0.192∗∗
(-0.50) (-1.02) (2.09) (-0.77) (-1.34) (2.79) (-0.79) (-0.48) (1.98)
Eff×High Corrupt -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.014 -0.002 0.017 0.018 -0.030 0.021
(-0.14) (0.38) (0.18) (1.08) (-0.09) (1.15) (0.85) (-0.67) (0.86)
Enf -0.119∗∗ -0.125∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.104 -0.156 0.033 -0.092 0.070 -0.144
(-2.14) (-1.68) (-2.66) (-1.06) (-0.91) (0.18) (-0.61) (0.30) (-0.61)
Enf×High Corrupt -0.019∗ -0.005 -0.035∗ 0.018 -0.021 0.062∗ 0.037 -0.017 0.024
(-1.67) (-0.33) (-1.80) (0.74) (-0.58) (1.77) (1.00) (-0.30) (0.39)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Ann ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Eff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Enf ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485 479,937 151,737 327,485
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.223 0.144 0.183 0.281 0.246 0.239 0.369 0.337
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Table 19: BHARs and ESG - Timing
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating buy and hold returns and Asset4 ESG scores over time. The dependent variables
are 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month buy and hold returns. High Asset4 is interacted with EU, an indicator variable that takes a value of
1 if the country in which the firm’s stock trades is in the EU, and year variables, where Yi is the ith year after the announcement of MAR.
Firm-level control variables are the 3-year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry fixed effects
are based on 2-digit SIC industries. Models (1), (4), and (7) use both buy and sell transactions. Models (2), (5), and (8) use only buy
transactions. Models (3), (6), and (9) use only sell transactions. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Y-1×High Asset4×EU 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.031 0.025 -0.005 0.002 0.051 -0.030
(1.23) (0.75) (0.58) (0.96) (0.52) (-0.16) (0.04) (0.52) (-0.47)
Y0×High Asset4×EU 0.002 0.029∗ -0.015 0.022 0.071 -0.018 -0.048 0.086 -0.083∗
(0.13) (1.88) (-1.03) (0.75) (1.43) (-0.67) (-0.73) (0.83) (-1.81)
Y+1×High Asset4×EU 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.026 -0.021 0.024 -0.061 -0.064 -0.059
(0.81) (0.00) (0.15) (0.96) (-0.47) (0.84) (-1.10) (-0.66) (-1.01)
Y+2×High Asset4×EU 0.034∗∗∗ 0.016 0.016 0.077∗∗ 0.007 0.046 0.040 -0.021 0.011
(2.79) (0.91) (1.23) (2.13) (0.15) (1.20) (0.57) (-0.20) (0.15)
Y+3×High Asset4×EU 0.016 0.026 -0.005 0.025 0.039 -0.037 -0.045 0.023 -0.121∗
(1.42) (1.48) (-0.41) (0.87) (0.82) (-1.22) (-0.74) (0.21) (-1.94)
Y+4×High Asset4×EU 0.016 0.024 -0.015 0.047 0.078 -0.077∗∗ -0.006 0.101 -0.194∗∗
(1.14) (1.19) (-0.85) (1.26) (1.35) (-2.18) (-0.10) (0.94) (-2.30)
Y+5×High Asset4×EU -0.009 0.001 -0.023 -0.017 -0.090∗ 0.030 -0.191∗∗ -0.136 -0.211∗
(-0.65) (0.06) (-1.50) (-0.53) (-1.93) (0.91) (-2.10) (-1.31) (-1.91)
Y+6×High Asset4×EU -0.047 -0.025 -0.019 -0.079 0.126 -0.012 -0.217 0.177 -0.085
(-0.82) (-0.54) (-0.24) (-0.86) (1.34) (-0.14) (-1.30) (1.01) (-0.43)
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Table 19 Continued
1-Month BHAR 3-Month BHAR 6-Month BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422 123,147 23,640 99,422
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.298 0.151 0.193 0.344 0.243 0.255 0.442 0.338
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Table 20: CARs
This table reports the t-test results of CARs for all enforcement events for whether the CARs are
significantly different from 0. EW CAR is the equal-eighted CAR. VW CAR is the value-weighted
CAR. CAR windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date and i is the number of days after
the event date. Models (1), (2), and (3) test whether the CARs are significantly different from 0
for the full sample. Models (4), (5), and (6) test whether the CARs are singificantly different from
0 if the event occurred in the country on which the firm’s stock trades.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
EW CAR -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗
(-12.28) (-22.66) (-29.27) (-10.81) (-11.81) (-12.99)
VW CAR -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗ -0.0008∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(-9.14) (-13.12) (-18.92) (-2.85) (-3.15) (-5.87)
Observations 410002 410002 410002 44456 44456 44456
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 21: CARs - Insider Dealing
This table reports the t-test results of CARs for events involving enforcement of insider dealing
for whether the CARs are significantly different from 0. EW CAR is the equal-eighted CAR. VW
CAR is the value-weighted CAR. CAR windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date and i
is the number of days after the event date. Models (1), (2), and (3) test whether the CARs are
significantly different from 0 for the full sample. Models (4), (5), and (6) test whether the CARs
are singificantly different from 0 if the event occurred in the country on which the firm’s stock
trades.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
EW CAR -0.0005∗ -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0017∗ -0.0021∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗
(-2.51) (-9.64) (-25.52) (-2.50) (-2.70) (-6.50)
VW CAR -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗ -0.0021∗
(-9.77) (-8.64) (-9.76) (-4.69) (-3.04) (-2.38)
Observations 40771 40814 40811 3059 3059 3059
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 22: CARs - Sanction Pecuniary Amount
This table reports the t-test results of CARs by sanction amount. EW CAR is the equal-eighted
CAR. VW CAR is the value-weighted CAR. CAR windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date
and i is the number of days after the event date. Events are split by the median within country by
the pecuniary amount of the sanction imposed. Models (1), (2), and (3) test the difference between
less and more pecuniary amounts for all countries. Models (4), (5), and (6) test the difference
between less and more pecuniary amounts for events that occurred in the country on which the
firm’s stock trades.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
EW CAR 0.0001 -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0030∗∗∗
(0.76) (-5.35) (-8.40) (-5.48) (-4.90) (-5.04)
VW CAR 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0005 -0.0010∗ -0.0012∗
(4.58) (2.97) (2.35) (1.16) (-2.00) (-2.19)
Observations 398102 398102 398102 43027 43027 43027
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 23: CARs - COVID-19
This table reports the t-test results of CARs comparing the event dates prior to the first lockdown
in the EU countries in the sample to the events after this date. EW CAR is the equal-eighted CAR.
VW CAR is the value-weighted CAR. CAR windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date and
i is the number of days after the event date. Models (1), (2), and (3) test the difference between
pre- and post-COVID-19 periods for all events. Models (4), (5), and (6) test the difference between
pre- and post-COVID-19 periods for events that occurred in the country in which the firm’s stock
trades.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
EW CAR -0.0012∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0018 0.0001 -0.0024
(-2.88) (-4.00) (-5.76) (-1.09) (0.04) (-1.16)
VW CAR -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0034∗ -0.0041∗ -0.0051∗
(-3.29) (-3.76) (-6.05) (-2.22) (-2.30) (-2.56)
Observations 410002 410002 410002 44456 44456 44456
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 24: CARs - Legal or Natural Violator
This table reports the t-test results of CARs comparing the events where the violation was chargedd
against a legal person to those charged against a natural person. EW CAR is the equal-eighted
CAR. VW CAR is the value-weighted CAR. CAR windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event
date and i is the number of days after the event date. Models (1), (2), and (3) test the difference
between events charged against legal persons to events charged against natural persons for all
events. Models (4), (5), and (6) test the difference between events charged against legal persons to
events charged against natural persons for events that occurred in the country in which the firm’s
stock trades.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
EW CAR -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0068∗∗∗ -0.0078∗∗∗ -0.0092∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗
(-5.02) (-22.36) (-32.41) (-14.06) (-14.39) (-14.28)
VW CAR -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0002
(-5.73) (-4.15) (-4.19) (-1.87) (-1.36) (-0.36)
Observations 454145 454145 454145 48014 48014 48014
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 25: CARs - Matching Firm
This table reports the t-tests of whether the firm involved in the event had CARs significantly
different from 0. EW CAR is the equal-eighted CAR. VW CAR is the value-weighted CAR. CAR
windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date and i is the number of days after the event
date. Models (1), (2), and (3) test whether the CARs are significantly different from 0 for the full
sample. Models (4), (5), and (6) test whether the CARs are singificantly different from 0 if the
event occurred in the country on which the firm’s stock trades.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
EW CAR -0.0058 -0.0054 0.0036 -0.0069 -0.0059 0.0025
(-0.71) (-0.54) (0.30) (-0.78) (-0.55) (0.20)
VW CAR -0.0043 -0.0030 0.0085 -0.0054 -0.0031 0.0082
(-0.54) (-0.31) (0.78) (-0.63) (-0.30) (0.70)
Observations 42 42 42 39 39 39
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 26: CARs - Profitability
This table reports the t-test results of CARs where firms are split by the profitability of their trades.
The results compare the more profitable to the less profitable after MAR became effective, split by
the sample median. Panel A (B) splits using equal-weighted (value-weighted) buy-and-hold returns
of insider trades. EW CAR is the equal-eighted CAR. VW CAR is the value-weighted CAR. CAR
windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date and i is the number of days after the event date.
Models (1), (2), and (3) test the difference between more and less profitable insider trading for all
events. Models (4), (5), and (6) test the difference between more and less profitable insider trading
if the event occurred in the country in which the firm’s stock trades.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
Panel A
EW CAR -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0009
(-0.40) (-0.28) (-1.24) (-0.71) (-0.68) (-0.90)
VW CAR -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003
(-0.21) (-0.05) (-1.10) (-0.53) (-0.45) (-0.33)
Observations 106445 106445 106445 10288 10288 10288
Panel B
EW CAR -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0000
(-0.85) (-0.10) (-0.28) (0.51) (0.54) (-0.00)
VW CAR -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007
(-0.64) (0.09) (0.08) (0.84) (0.90) (0.80)
Observations 106445 106445 106445 10288 10288 10288
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 27: CARs by Firm-Level Culture
This table reports the t-test results of CARs by firm-level culture measures. EW CAR is the equal-eighted CAR. VW CAR is the
value-weighted CAR. CAR windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date and i is the number of days after the event date. The
firms in the sample are split by the sample median based on the A4IR score, social score, and environmental score. Panel A (B) uses all
events (events that occurred in the country in which the firm’s stock trades). Models (1), (2), and (3) test the difference between low
and high A4IR scores. Models (4), (5), and (6) test the difference between low and high environmental scores. Models (7), (8), and (9)
test the difference between low and high social scores.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
Panel A
EW CAR 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004
(0.61) (0.53) (-0.46) (0.77) (0.96) (0.82) (0.81) (0.96) (1.28)
VW CAR 0.0004∗ 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006∗∗ 0.0005∗ 0.0005 0.0006∗∗ 0.0005∗ 0.0006∗
(2.21) (1.52) (0.92) (2.81) (2.10) (1.79) (2.81) (2.08) (2.28)
Observations 73453 73453 73453 73453 73453 73453 73453 73453 73453
Panel B
EW CAR 0.0006 0.0010 0.0012 0.0004 0.0008 0.0007 0.0002 0.0008 0.0008
(0.75) (1.11) (1.18) (0.43) (0.85) (0.68) (0.29) (0.82) (0.78)
VW CAR 0.0011 0.0019∗ 0.0023∗ 0.0009 0.0011 0.0014 0.0007 0.0010 0.0018
(1.61) (2.37) (2.47) (1.23) (1.23) (1.40) (1.02) (1.19) (1.91)
Observations 5217 5217 5217 5217 5217 5217 5217 5217 5217
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 28: CARs by Country-Level Culture
This table reports the t-test results of CARs by country-level culture measures. EW CAR is the equal-eighted CAR. VW CAR is the
value-weighted CAR. CAR windows are labeled (0,i) where 0 is the event date and i is the number of days after the event date. The
firms in the sample are split by the sample median based on Hofstede individuality scores, Hofstede uncertainty avoidance scores, and
Corruption Perceptions Index scores. Panel A (B) uses all events (events that occurred in the country in which the firm’s stock trades).
Models (1), (2), and (3) test the difference between low and high individuality scores. Models (4), (5), and (6) test the difference between
low and high uncertainty avoidance scores. Models (7), (8), and (9) test the difference between low and high corruption scores.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,3)
Panel A
EW CAR 0.0001 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0003∗ 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003
(0.44) (2.67) (0.87) (-4.12) (-2.18) (0.16) (-0.31) (-0.44) (1.72)
VW CAR 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004∗ -0.0005∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.98) (0.21) (1.45) (-0.85) (-2.51) (-2.95) (0.71) (-0.37) (-1.74)
Observations 410002 410002 410002 410002 410002 410002 410002 410002 410002
Panel B
EW CAR -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0022 -0.0033 -0.0036
(-0.43) (0.96) (-1.59) (-4.76) (-4.27) (-4.63) (-1.46) (-1.82) (-1.81)
VW CAR -0.0007 0.0006 0.0020∗ 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0021
(-1.02) (0.74) (2.13) (0.19) (-1.49) (0.06) (-1.64) (-1.53) (-1.10)
Observations 44456 44456 44456 44456 44456 44456 44456 44456 44456
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 29: Correlations
This table reports the correlations of the variables we have ussed to split the sample in previous t-tests. Inside is an indicator variable
that takes a values of 1 if the enforcement was related to insider dealing. Legal is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the
enforcement was against a legal person. High Amt is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the enforcement had an amount above
the sample median by country. COVID-19 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the event date is after the first lockdown
among the sample countries. Ctry is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the event occured in the same country where the
firm’s stock trades. Asset4 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an Asset4 ESG score an above sample median.
Soc is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an Asset4 social score above the sample median. Env is an indicator
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an Asset4 environmental score above the sample median. IDV is an indicator variable
that takes a value of 1 if the country in which the firm’s stock trades has a Hofstede individuality score above the sample median. UAI
is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which the firm’s stock trades has a Hofstede uncertainty avoidance score
above the sample median. Corrupt is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which the firm’s stock trades has a
corruption score below the sample median.
Inside Legal High Amt COVID-19 Ctry Asset4 Soc Env IDV UAI Corrupt
Inside 1.00
Legal 0.24∗∗∗ 1.00
High Amt 0.04∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 1.00
COVID-19 0.02∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 1.00
Ctry -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 1.00
Asset4 -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 1.00
Soc 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 0.04∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 1.00
Env 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 1.00
IDV -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 1.00
UAI -0.00∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ 1.00
Corrupt -0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.00 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 1.00
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 30: CARs - Same Country
This table reports the OLS regressions of CARs results relating split variables used in CAR t-tests
and whether the event occurred in the same country as the one in which the firm’s stock trades.
The dependent variable is EW (VW) CAR, which is the equal-weighted (value-weighted) CAR.
Independent variables defined in Table 1. Models (1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6) use windows
(0,1), (0,2), (0,3) days around the event date, repsectively. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated
from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
EW CAR VW CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ctry -0.0006 0.0011∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0007
(-1.58) (2.54) (0.27) (-0.82) (0.09) (-1.47)
Inside 0.0004∗ 0.0007∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0003
(1.68) (2.38) (-9.43) (-3.00) (-0.94) (-0.82)
Inside×Ctry 0.0017∗∗ 0.0008 0.0029∗∗ -0.0021∗∗ -0.0027∗∗ -0.0024∗∗
(1.99) (0.76) (2.34) (-2.44) (-2.57) (-2.06)
Legal 0.0001 -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0059∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(0.82) (-17.14) (-23.47) (-6.79) (-5.92) (-7.41)
Legal×Ctry -0.0093∗∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0004 0.0013∗∗
(-13.84) (-9.51) (-5.82) (1.12) (0.57) (1.96)
High Amt -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
(-2.63) (4.23) (8.19) (-5.35) (-5.13) (-3.73)
High Amt×Ctry 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗ -0.0001 0.0014∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
(6.54) (3.84) (2.52) (-0.26) (2.52) (2.97)
COVID-19 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗
(3.74) (3.90) (4.83) (5.25) (4.90) (6.39)
COVID-19×Ctry 0.0012 -0.0049∗∗ -0.0038∗ 0.0018 0.0007 -0.0007
(0.79) (-2.25) (-1.69) (1.12) (0.32) (-0.32)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.012
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Table 31: CARs - Asset4 ESG
This table reports the OLS regressions of CARs results relating split variables used in CAR t-tests
and high Asset4 ESG scores. The dependent variable is EW (VW) CAR, which is the equal-
weighted (value-weighted) CAR. Asset4 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm
has an Asset4 ESG score an above sample median. All other independent variables defined in Table
1. Models (1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6) use windows (0,1), (0,2), (0,3) days around the
event date, repsectively. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
EW CAR VW CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.0016∗∗ -0.0003
(3.75) (3.31) (-2.03) (2.19) (2.20) (-0.33)
Inside×Asset4 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0004
(-0.44) (-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.38) (-0.74) (0.37)
Legal -0.0003 -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0044∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗∗
(-0.83) (-5.20) (-7.12) (-3.06) (-2.97) (-2.92)
Legal×Asset4 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0008 0.0005 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗ 0.0017∗∗
(3.42) (1.20) (0.59) (2.77) (2.58) (2.08)
High Amt -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0010∗∗ -0.0011∗∗
(-0.93) (-0.51) (0.31) (-1.07) (-2.32) (-2.21)
High Amt×Asset4 0.0001 0.0006 0.0015∗∗ 0.0006 0.0008 0.0014∗∗
(0.26) (1.02) (2.18) (1.22) (1.40) (2.02)
COVID-19 0.0045∗∗ 0.0049∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(2.54) (2.10) (2.94) (3.48) (3.12) (4.28)
COVID-19×Asset4 -0.0003 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0007
(-0.15) (0.56) (0.50) (-0.23) (0.44) (0.24)
Ctry -0.0011 0.0001 0.0016 0.0003 0.0017∗∗ 0.0021∗∗
(-1.46) (0.11) (1.60) (0.39) (2.00) (2.22)
Ctry×Asset4 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0014∗ -0.0024∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗
(-1.30) (-1.08) (-1.23) (-1.67) (-2.32) (-2.75)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.021 0.019 0.020
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Table 32: CARs - Social Score
This table reports the OLS regressions of CARs results relating split variables used in CAR t-tests
and high Asset4 social scores. The dependent variable is EW (VW) CAR, which is the equal-
weighted (value-weighted) CAR. Soc is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has
an Asset4 social score above the sample median. All other independent variables defined in Table
1. Models (1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6) use windows (0,1), (0,2), (0,3) days around the
event date, repsectively. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
EW CAR VW CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0015 0.0009 0.0016∗∗ -0.0000
(3.32) (3.35) (-1.54) (1.50) (2.11) (-0.03)
Inside×Soc 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0000
(0.37) (-0.77) (-1.21) (0.68) (-0.57) (-0.03)
Legal -0.0005 -0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗
(-1.19) (-5.39) (-6.81) (-3.81) (-3.80) (-3.46)
Legal×Soc 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0013∗ 0.0006 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
(3.52) (1.85) (0.65) (3.47) (3.59) (2.59)
High Amt 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0010∗∗ -0.0011∗∗
(0.35) (-0.13) (0.69) (-0.19) (-2.28) (-2.06)
High Amt×Soc -0.0007 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0000 0.0008 0.0012∗
(-1.38) (0.47) (1.41) (-0.04) (1.36) (1.73)
COVID-19 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗
(4.08) (3.59) (3.90) (4.79) (4.44) (5.11)
COVID-19×Soc -0.0052∗∗∗ -0.0053∗∗ -0.0050∗ -0.0044∗∗∗ -0.0043∗∗ -0.0044∗
(-2.90) (-2.26) (-1.85) (-2.64) (-1.98) (-1.70)
Ctry -0.0017∗∗ -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0013
(-2.08) (-0.15) (0.47) (-0.35) (1.01) (1.30)
Ctry×Soc -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0015
(-0.21) (-0.55) (0.32) (-0.50) (-0.77) (-1.26)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.021 0.019 0.020
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Table 33: CARs - Environmental Score
This table reports the OLS regressions of CARs results relating split variables used in CAR t-
tests and high Asset4 environmental scores. The dependent variable is EW (VW) CAR, which
is the equal-weighted (value-weighted) CAR. Env is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1
if the firm has an Asset4 environmental score above the sample median. All other independent
variables defined in Table 1. Models (1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6) use windows (0,1),
(0,2), (0,3) days around the event date, repsectively. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
EW CAR VW CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0016∗ 0.0009 0.0013∗ -0.0001
(3.48) (3.13) (-1.75) (1.58) (1.70) (-0.06)
Inside×Env 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0012 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.30) (-0.44) (-0.97) (0.64) (0.03) (-0.00)
Legal 0.0001 -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0015∗∗
(0.16) (-3.88) (-5.64) (-2.43) (-2.49) (-2.28)
Legal×Env 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0010∗ 0.0014∗∗ 0.0010
(1.57) (0.18) (-0.46) (1.87) (2.03) (1.20)
High Amt -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0010∗∗ -0.0009∗
(-0.33) (-0.21) (0.99) (-0.68) (-2.33) (-1.79)
High Amt×Env -0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0003 0.0008 0.0009
(-0.50) (0.59) (1.04) (0.63) (1.39) (1.34)
COVID-19 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗
(2.98) (2.66) (3.33) (3.59) (3.25) (4.04)
COVID-19×Env -0.0032∗ -0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0028
(-1.70) (-1.37) (-1.39) (-1.54) (-1.10) (-0.99)
Ctry -0.0010 0.0006 0.0020∗ 0.0005 0.0016∗ 0.0020∗∗
(-1.21) (0.66) (1.81) (0.72) (1.86) (2.05)
Ctry×Env -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0016∗ -0.0018∗ -0.0025∗∗
(-1.29) (-1.55) (-1.42) (-1.77) (-1.74) (-2.14)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457 82,457
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.021 0.019 0.020
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Table 34: CARs - Individualism
This table reports the OLS regressions of CARs results relating split variables used in CAR t-tests
and high individualism. The dependent variable is EW (VW) CAR, which is the equal-weighted
(value-weighted) CAR. IDV is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which
the firm’s stock trades has a Hofstede individuality score above the sample median. All other
independent variables defined in Table 1. Models (1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6) use windows
(0,1), (0,2), (0,3) days around the event date, repsectively. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated
from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
EW CAR VW CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside -0.0001 0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0009∗
(-0.19) (3.14) (-4.65) (-2.53) (-0.87) (-1.91)
Inside×IDV 0.0009∗∗ -0.0010∗ -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0007
(2.05) (-1.77) (-1.41) (0.01) (-0.46) (1.09)
Legal 0.0003 -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗
(1.23) (-8.11) (-12.06) (-2.39) (-3.35) (-4.12)
Legal×IDV -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0002
(-6.12) (-8.08) (-7.79) (-2.66) (-0.73) (-0.52)
High Amt -0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0007∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0005∗
(-2.58) (0.42) (2.31) (-2.99) (-3.03) (-1.70)
High Amt×IDV 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
(2.88) (3.88) (4.31) (-0.58) (0.29) (-0.16)
COVID-19 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗
(2.67) (2.26) (3.04) (4.40) (3.74) (4.94)
COVID-19×IDV 0.0025∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗
(2.33) (2.98) (3.01) (2.02) (2.83) (2.69)
Ctry -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ 0.0004 0.0014∗
(-4.45) (-2.14) (-4.18) (-2.51) (0.56) (1.87)
Ctry×IDV 0.0010 0.0014∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0011∗ -0.0002 -0.0019∗∗
(1.48) (1.85) (3.85) (1.68) (-0.30) (-2.12)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.012
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Table 35: CARs - Uncertainty Avoidance
This table reports the OLS regressions of CARs results relating split variables used in CAR t-
tests and high uncertainty avoidance. The dependent variable is EW (VW) CAR, which is the
equal-weighted (value-weighted) CAR. UAI is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the
country in which the firm’s stock trades has a Hofstede uncertainty avoidance score above the
sample median. All other independent variables defined in Table 1. Models (1) and (4), (2) and
(5), (3) and (6) use windows (0,1), (0,2), (0,3) days around the event date, repsectively. t-statistics
in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
EW CAR VW CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0005∗ -0.0001 -0.0004
(1.35) (-1.28) (-5.77) (-1.73) (-0.26) (-1.00)
Inside×UAI -0.0000 0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗ -0.0010∗ 0.0002
(-0.09) (4.55) (-3.98) (-2.02) (-1.79) (0.32)
Legal -0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0048∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗
(-7.99) (-15.07) (-16.95) (-5.45) (-5.16) (-5.83)
Legal×UAI 0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0000 0.0002 0.0003
(5.23) (-4.10) (-10.20) (-0.13) (0.49) (0.65)
High Amt 0.0000 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
(0.01) (3.36) (4.55) (-6.03) (-4.39) (-2.98)
High Amt×UAI -0.0001 0.0008∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0003
(-0.38) (2.20) (5.25) (2.61) (1.37) (0.87)
COVID-19 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗
(4.09) (3.86) (4.42) (5.37) (4.93) (6.29)
COVID-19×UAI -0.0023∗ -0.0030∗ 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0003
(-1.93) (-1.89) (0.10) (-0.32) (-0.49) (-0.20)
Ctry -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0002 0.0005 0.0007
(-7.60) (-3.10) (-5.05) (-0.74) (1.21) (1.57)
Ctry×UAI 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0030∗∗∗
(3.54) (4.00) (10.17) (-0.45) (-0.83) (-3.41)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.012
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Table 36: CARs - Corruption
This table reports the OLS regressions of CARs results relating split variables used in CAR t-tests
and high corruption. The dependent variable is EW (VW) CAR, which is the equal-weighted (value-
weighted) CAR. Corrupt is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country in which
the firm’s stock trades has a corruption score below the sample median. All other independent
variables defined in Table 1. Models (1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6) use windows (0,1),
(0,2), (0,3) days around the event date, repsectively. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
EW CAR VW CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside 0.0005∗∗ 0.0003 -0.0029∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0007∗
(2.09) (0.84) (-7.58) (-2.98) (-1.20) (-1.90)
Inside×Corrupt -0.0002 0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0009
(-0.34) (3.10) (-0.37) (-0.81) (-0.96) (1.25)
Legal -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗
(-6.32) (-19.02) (-23.09) (-7.12) (-6.67) (-8.05)
Legal×Corrupt 0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
(3.03) (-0.56) (-3.30) (2.20) (2.58) (3.49)
High Amt -0.0001 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0004∗
(-0.45) (4.82) (7.70) (-5.57) (-3.82) (-1.82)
High Amt×Corrupt 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0008
(0.10) (0.38) (0.97) (1.12) (-0.23) (-1.62)
COVID-19 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
(3.98) (3.75) (4.70) (5.47) (5.08) (6.55)
COVID-19×Corrupt -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗ -0.0044 -0.0032∗ -0.0050∗∗ -0.0065∗∗
(-2.60) (-2.06) (-1.45) (-1.79) (-1.99) (-2.48)
Ctry -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005∗ 0.0001 -0.0002
(-6.01) (-0.54) (-0.88) (-1.88) (0.26) (-0.62)
Ctry×Corrupt 0.0021∗∗ 0.0012 0.0007 0.0023∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.0019
(2.15) (1.01) (0.47) (2.39) (1.97) (1.33)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103 441,103
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012
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Table 37: Tobin’s Q and Culture
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating Tobin’s Q and measures of firm-level
culture. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. High Asset4 is an indicator variable that takes a
value of 1 if the firm has an above median Asset4 ESG score. High Soc is an indicator variable that
takes a value of 1 if the firm has an above median Asset4 social score. High Env is an indicator
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has an above median Asset4 environmental score. High
IDV is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s country has an individuality score
above the sample median. High UAI is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s
country has an uncertainty avoidance score above the sample median. High Corrupt is an indicator
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firms’ country has a corruption score below the sample median.
Post ESMA is an indiciator variable that takes a value of 1 for the period after the first publication
of the the ESMA MAR enforcement report. Firm-level control variables are the 3-year average
before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry fixed effects are based
on 2-digit SIC industries. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post ESMA×High Asset4 0.225∗∗
(2.07)
Post ESMA×High Soc 0.160
(1.56)
Post ESMA×High Env 0.225∗∗
(2.50)
Post ESMA×High IDV 0.010
(0.17)
Post ESMA×High UAI -0.014
(-0.25)
Post ESMA×High Corrupt -0.034
(-0.44)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Post ESMA ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 7,367 7,367 7,367 32,396 32,396 32,396
Adjusted R2 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.689 0.689 0.689
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Table 38: Tobin’s Q and Profitability
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating Tobin’s Q and high profitability. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. High EW
BHARi is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s mean equal-weighted i-month BHAR is above the sample median. High
VW BHARi is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s mean value-weighted i-month BHAR is above the sample median.
Less EW is indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s mean equal-weighted profitability declined after MAR became effective.
Less VW is indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s mean value-weighted profitability declined after MAR became effective.
Post ESMA is an indiciator variable that takes a value of 1 for the period after the first publication of the the ESMA MAR enforcement
report. Firm-level control variables are the 3-year average before MAR was announced and include Size, ROA, and Leverage. Industry
fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC industries. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post ESMA×1M BHAR -0.088
(-1.19)
Post ESMA×3M BHAR -0.034
(-0.48)
Post ESMA×6M BHAR -0.132∗
(-1.93)
Post ESMA×1M VBHAR 0.030
(0.43)
Post ESMA×3M VBHAR 0.003
(0.03)
Post ESMA×6M VBHAR -0.022
(-0.31)




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post ESMA×Less EW -0.005
(-0.07)
Post ESMA×Less VW 0.021
(0.30)
Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind × Year ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firm Controls × Post ESMA ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 20,805 20,805 20,805 20,805 20,805 20,805 20,805 20,805
Adjusted R2 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688
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